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THE iRULE OF ANNOUNCEMENT AND
UNLAWFUL ENTRY: MILLER v. UNITED
STATES AND KER v. CALIFORNIA
G. ROBERT BnABy t
[T]he sheriff (if the doors be not open) may break the party's house, either
to arrest him, or to do other execution of the King's process, if otherwise he
cannot enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his
coming, and to make request to open the doors.1
If we do not on a national scale attack organized criminals with weapons
and techniques as effective as their own, they will destroy us.2
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his classic dissent in United States v.
Rabinowitz, pointed out that "the safeguards of liberty have frequently
been forged in controversies involving not very nice people." 3 Few
cases decided by the Supreme Court since Rabinowitz have better
illustrated that observation than Miller v. United States 4 and Ker v.
California." This Article will consider the problems posed in the
administration of federal criminal justice by the "liberty forged" in
these two decisions.
Until the Miller decision in 1958, the Supreme Court had never
squarely considered and decided a question of announcement and un-
lawful entry. It is therefore appropriate to preface consideration of
Miller and Ker with a review of the historical development of these
concepts, the roots of which extend into early Anglo-American legal
experience."
t Trial attorney, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, United States De-
partment of Justice. A.B. 1957, LL.B. 1960, University of Notre Dame. Member,
District of Columbia, North Carolina, and Supreme Court Bars. The author wishes
to express his thanks to Professor Anthony G. Amsterdam of the University of Penn-
sylvania Law School for his perceptive criticism of the ideas and suggestions embodied
in this Article. The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the author
and should not be attributed to the Department of Justice or to Professor Amsterdam.
1 Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603).
2 KENNEDY, THE ENEMY WITHIN 265 (1960).
3 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950).
4 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
5 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
6 Maitland aptly observed: "Today we study the day before yesterday, in order
that yesterday may not paralyze today, and today may not paralyze tomorrow."
3 MAITLAND, CoLLEcTED PAPERS 439 (1911), quoted in Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDIcIAL PROCESS 54 (1921).
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I. COMMON LAW
The common law maxim, "Every man's house is his castle," '
severely limited the sheriff's right to make a forcible entry into a home.
Although the facts in Semayne's Case," decided in 1603, did not in-
volve forcible entry,9 it has long been the leading decision interpreting
the maxim. In that case the court resolved six broad propositions: "
(1) Every man's house is his castle, and defense of that house may
extend even to death, and it is not a felony.
(2) A sheriff may break and enter, however, to deliver seisin where
a house is recovered in any real action.
(3) Yet the liberty of the house does not hold against the King, and
so for felony or suspicion of felony, or to do execution of the King's
process, after signifying the cause of his coming and requesting the
doors to be opened, a sheriff may break and enter, if admission is
refused.
(4) Where the door is open, on the other hand, a sheriff may enter
to do execution on the body or the goods of a debtor, but at the suit of
an individual, it is not lawful to break and enter, for the action does
not concern the commonwealth.
(5) The privilege of the house is reserved, moreover, to those law-
fully therein, and it does not extend to strangers or those whose goods
are there to escape the processes of the law by fraud.
(6) Still, in civil cases, where entry for execution is proper, notice
ought to be given so it might be known that shutting of the house is
unlawful.
7 See BROOM, LEGAL MAxis 281 (10th ed. 1929). The classic statement of the
Englishman's commitment to the sacred character of his home is, of course, William
Pitt's eloquent remarks in a Parliamentary debate on a proposed cider tax: "The
poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the force of the Crown. It may
be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter;
but all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement." Quoted in
LAssoN, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 49-50 (1937).
8 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603).
9 Peter Semayne and George Berisford owned a house in Blackfriars in which
Berisford had left some personal property. Berisford died without having paid
Richard Gresham all he owed him. Gresham secured a civil writ of attachment on
Berisford's property, but when the sheriff sought to serve it, Semayne denied him
entry. Gresham then sued Semayne for the loss and benefit of this writ.
I'D When the case first came before the Queen's Bench no decision could be
reached. Chief Justice Popham and Mr. Justice Gawly were of the opinion that the
sheriff had the right to break and enter. Mr. Justice Fenner and Mr. Justice Yel-
verton were of the contrary opinion. It was not until the first year of the reign of
James I, when Mr. Justice Williams was appointed, and the case reargued, that a
majority could be obtained. See Curtis v. Hubbard, 4 Hill 437, 438-39 (N.Y. 1842).
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The propositions resolved in Semayne's Case were by no means
an innovation. Biblical law, for example, had prohibited a creditor
from entering his debtor's house to obtain security for the debt.11
Early Anglo-Saxon law itself recognized the crime of hamsocne, the
"gist of which was solely the forcible entry into a man's dwelling
... "J Passages in the earlier Year Books ' and dicta in some
later cases " reflected similar principles. Subsequent judicial treatment
of civil arrest and execution, moreover, did not differ from the broad
dicta of the court.' 5 The privilege was confined to the dwelling house,
while elsewhere forcible entry was uniformily upheld. 6 Only the
outer door was held privileged; other doors could be broken provided
initial entry was peaceful.17  Announcement was required neither
before inner doors 1  nor prior to entry into a nondwelling 9  "Break-
ing" was thought limited to forcible entry. ° However, the status of
entry by trick, absent force, was not entirely clear.2
The extent to which privilege of the house extended to criminal
rather than civil arrests seems never to have been considered squarely.
"lDeuteronomy 24:10.
12 LAssox, op. cit. supra note 7, at 19. (Emphasis added.)
13 See, e.g., Y.B. Pasch. 13 Edw. 4, pl. 5.
14See, e.g., Maleverer v. Sprinke, 1 Dyer 35b, 36b, 73 Eng. Rep. 79, 81 (KB.
1537).
15 See, e.g., Foster v. Hill, 1 Bulstrode 146, 80 Eng. Rep. 839 (K.B. 1611);
Cook's Case, Cro. Car. 537, 79 Eng. Rep. 1063 (K.B. 1640).
16 Penton v. Brown, 1 Keble 699, 83 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1664). By analogy
to the law of burglary and specifically following Semayne's Case, the court held
that, to execute a civil writ, an entry without announcement into a barn not part
of a dwelling house was lawful. The rule of Penton v. Brown is considered estab-
lished beyond question in English law. See Hodder v. Williams, [1895] 2 Q.B. 663.
17Lee v. Gansel, 1 Cowp. 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 935 (K.B. 1774). Finding that the
privilege was limited to the outer door, and by analogy to the law of burglary, Lord
Mansfield held that the door to a lodger's room was an inner door which could be
lawfully broken to make a civil arrest when entry to the house was peaceful. It
should be noted, however, that Lord Mansfield was no friend of any privilege which
obstructed the collection of debts. See People v. Hubbard, 24 Wend. 368, 373-74(N.Y. 1840).
'sCompare Ratcliffe v. Burton, 3 Bos. & Pul. 223, 127 Eng. Rep. 123 (C.P.
1802) (required), with Hutchison v. Birch, 4 Taunt 619, 128 Eng. Rep. 473 (C.P.
1812) (not required), and Lloyd v. Sandilands, 3 Taunt. 250, 129 Eng. Rep. 379
(C.P. 1818) (same).
19 Penton v. Brown, 1 Keble 699, 83 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1664). See note 16
sup ra.
20 See Ryan v. Shiloch, 7 Ex. 70, 155 Eng. Rep. 861 (1851) (Semayne's Case
held limited to force).
2 1 Finding entry by fraud to serve civil process lawful, Lord Mansfield in
King v. Backhouse, Lofft 61, 98 Eng. Rep. 533 (K.B. 1772), held the householder
guilty of criminal assault for putting the officer in fear of physical injury. But see
Park v. Evans, Hobart 62, 80 Eng. Rep. 211 (K.B. 1615). Modern text writers
have usually concluded that stratagem was lawful. See, e.g., Wilgus, Arrest Without
a Warrant, 22 Micx. L. REv. 798, 806 (1924); Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25
IowA L. REv. 201, 247 (1940).
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In addition, the right to arrest without a warrant always complicated
the picture.22 It is not entirely clear that the right to arrest without
a warrant automatically carried with it, in every case, the right to
break doors when necessary to effect the arrest." The chief contro-
versy centered on the right to arrest and break doors on a suspicion
of a felony. Dictum in the early Year Books seemed to uphold the
right,24 but the text writers expressed varying opinions on the issue.
Lord Coke was of the extreme view that even a warrant, which might
in some cases justify forcible entry, could not be issued on suspicion.
He considered such procedure contrary to the Magna Carta.2" Sir
Matthew Hale, on the other hand, was of the opinion that the right to
arrest without a warrant carried with it the right to break doors.2" It
was his view that when the officer acted virtute offici it was tantamount
to a non omittus." The reason justifying the arrest without a warrant
itself justified the breaking. William Hawkins agreed with Coke that
"probable suspicion only" would not justify such an extremity.28 Sir
Michael Foster likewise observed that "bare suspicion" would not
justify breaking.29 Blackstone, however, recognized the right to break
and enter on suspicion of felony, but limited it to the situations in
which a felony had actually occurred. 0
The application of the rule of announcement to criminal arrests
did not receive early detailed attention by the judiciary. Most of the
2 2 The law of arrest without a warrant has a history and a literature of its own.
Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REv. 541 (1924), exhaustively
examines the cases.
2 3 It has been said that an officer's authority to break and enter a dwelling house
without a warrant is limited to arrests for treason, felony, or for affray or other
breach of the peace committed in his presence. See McLennon v. Richardson, 81
Mass. 74, 77 (1860). Since the common-law restrictions on the right to arrest are
usually phrased in the same terms, the rule appears to be that an officer can break
doors under the common law when he is authorized to arrest. Perkins, The Law of
Arrest, 25 IOWA L. REv. 201, 245 n.292 (1940). See generally 76 A.L.R.2d 1432(1961) (entry to arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant) ; 5 A.L.R. 278 (1920)(entry to arrest without search warrant).
2 4 See, e.g., Y.B. Pasch. 13 Edw. 4, pl. 5.
5 4 CoxE, INSTITUTES *177-78. None of the subsequent text writers appears
to have concurred. See, e.g., FOSTER, CROWN LAW 321 (3d ed. 1792).
262 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN *90-95, 116.
27 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN *581-83. A non ornittus was a clause usually
inserted in certain writs directing the sheriff not to "omit" to execute the writ
because of any privilege. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1203 (4th ed. 1951).
2 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 139 (6th ed. 1777).
2 FOSTER, CROWN LAW 321 (3d ed. 1792).
304 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *292. Textbook authorities still disagree.
1 BIsHoP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 196, at 144 n.9 (2d ed. 1913), terms the
Hawkins' view "absurd." 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 51, at 90 n.1 (10th
ed. 1918), follows Hale. RUSSELL, CRIME 440 (9th ed. 1936), has been cited for the
proposition that Hale's view has been superseded. Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d
456, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1949). Perhaps the most appropriate statement to be found in
the works of the text writers is Chitty's observation that there is a "considerable
degree of intricacy and confusion in the authorities which relate to this subject . .. .
CHITTY, CRIMINAL LAW *51.
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text writers apparently followed Semayne's dictum without question.
Sir Michael Foster, for example, broadly asserted: "In every case
where doors may be broken open in order to arrest, whether in cases
criminal or civil, there must be such notification, demand, and refusal,
before the parties concerned proceed to that extremity." 31 It was not
until 1756 in the Case of Richard Curtis,"2 that the judiciary squarely
faced the scope of the announcement rule in the context of a criminal
case. The court unanimously upheld the right of an officer after due
notice to break and enter to execute a criminal warrant for a breach
of the peace. The majority also felt that "no precise form of words"
would be necessary to constitute adequate notice; it was sufficient if
notice was given that the party who sought to enter did not come as
a trespasser. The minority thought an explicit statement explaining
the warrant should have been made.-s
The full scope of the application of the rule in criminal cases,
however, was never judicially settled. Chief Judge Abbott, for ex-
ample, in Launock v. Brown,34 a case decided as late as 1819, was only
willing to apply the rule to situations where the offense charged was a
misdemeanor. He noted that it was "not . . . necessary . . . to
decide how far, in the case of a person charged with felony, it would
be necessary to make a previous demand of admittance before you
could justify breaking open the outer door of his house . . . . "
The extent to which the privilege of the house and the rule of an-
nouncement extended to the execution of search warrants at common
law also seems never to have been judicially settled. At early common
law the search warrant was unknown. Later, no less an authority than
Lord Coke explicitly stated that its issuance, at least on suspicion, ran
against the Magna Carta.3 6 The practice grew, however, and it re-
ceived authoritative judicial approbation in 1765 in the landmark
decision of Entick v. Carrington 7  Until that time the issuance and
31 FosTER, CROWN LAW 320 (3d ed. 1792).
32 Fost. 135, 168 Eng. Rep. 67 (K.B. 1757).
33 The minority view is apparently based on the notien that notice which included
only a reference to an "escape" warrant did not necessarily mean that the warrant
was issued at the instance of the King and thus did not indicate forcible entry was
lawful. Id. at 137, 168 Eng. Rep. at 68.
34 2 Barn. & Ald. 592, 106 Eng. Rep. 482 (K.B. 1819). See also Ratcliffe v.
Burton, 3 Bos. & Pul. 223, 230, 127 Eng. Rep. 123, 127 (C.P. 1802) (judgment specifi-
cally reserved on application of the rule to criminal cases).
35 2 Barn. & Aid. 592, 593, 106 Eng. Rep. 482, 483 (K-B. 1819). Mr. Justice
Bayley was not as restrained in his language. He observed: "[Elven in the execu-
tion of criminal process, you must demand admittance before you can justify breaking
open the outer door." Ibid.
36 4 CorE, INsTrrUTES *177.
372 Wils. K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765). In Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 626 (1886), Mr. Justice Bradley termed the Entick decision "one of the
permanent monuments of the British Constitution." The case involved a general
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execution of search warrants had received little attention either in the
courts or from the text writers.3 Sir Matthew Hale was one of the
few early writers to have devoted more than a passing reference to
the search warrant.3 9 It was his opinion that the warrant included a
non omittus of necessity, and where admittance was denied, after due
demand, the executing officer could break and enter.'
II. EARLY AMERICAN CASE LAW
The rule of Semayne's Case was widely followed in early Ameri-
can decisions. Civil arrest, it was held, could not be made by forcible
entry into a dwelling house. The leading American case is usually
thought to be Oystead v. Shed,4 decided by the Massachusetts Su-
preme Court in 1816. Likewise, a civil execution could not be law-
fully made by breaking and entering.42 Here Haggerty v. Wilber,'
which was decided in the Supreme Court of New York in 1819, is the
case most often cited. Consistently with Semayne's Case, it was held
that the privilege of the house did not obtain when the forcible entry
was made to seize specific goods " or possession of the house itself.45
Most of the traditional common-law qualifications of the privilege
were also widely adopted. The distinction between the inner door and
warrant issued by Lord Halifax, the Secretary of State, to search the house of John
Wilkes for alleged seditious libels. Lord Camden held the search illegal, yet observed
that a warrant could be issued for stolen goods. 2 Wils. K.B. at 291-92, 95 Eng.
Rep. at 818.
38 The legislative history of English search warrant practice is summarized in
LAssoN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 23-50.
392 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN *149-51; CHrrry, CRmUINAL LAW *64-67.
Chitty agreed that "upon demand, not opened" breaking in the execution of a search
warrant was proper. Id. at *66.
40 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN *150. Hale expressed two views on the matter.
Early in his treatise he denied the right, asserting that such entry must be per ostia
apentia. Id. at *116-17. He is, however, usually thought to have held finally the
later view. See Androscoggin R.R v. Richards, 41 Me. 233, 238 (1856); Bell v.
Clapp, 10 Johns. R. 263, 265 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) ; Chipman v. Bates, 15 Vt. 51, 60
(1843). Hale's view usually represented the current law or recommended a better
practice which later "hardened into law." LAssoN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 35.
41 13 Mass. 520 (1816). The decision actually turned on a procedural point
concerning the manner in which the action was pleaded. Yet, underlying the decision
was a substantive argument about the rights of a permanent lodger in a dwelling
house to be free from forcible civil arrest. The Supreme Court of New York had
earlier decided that a civil arrest could forcibly be made where only an inner door
was involved. Williams v. Spencer, 5 Johns. R. 352 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) (per
curiam). The Oystead decision, however, is the case usually cited for the broad
proposition.
42 Snydacker v. Brosse, 51 Ill. 357 (1869); Ilsley v. Nichols, 29 Mass. (12
Pick.) 270 (1832); Bailey v. Wright, 39 Mich. 96 (1878).
43 16 Johns. R. 287 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1819) (forcible entry permissible under civil
writ to attach goods in a store). Actually, the first American decision to deal with
forcible entry under a writ of attachment was State v. Thacham, 1 Bay 358 (S.C.
1794) (entry could not be made at night to attach a slave).
44Keith v. Johnson, 31 Ky. 604 (1833). But cf. State ex re. McPherson v.
Beckner, 132 Ind. 371, 31 N.E. 950 (1892).
5Howe v. Butterfield, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 302 (1849).
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the outer door, although criticized,4 was followed.4 7  Forcible entry
was allowed into nondwellings such as stores 48 and warehouses. 9
Breaking was still understood in a physical sense, and acts such as
lifting a latch 0 or gaining entrance through a broken window "' were
held to constitute an unlawful breaking within the rule. It was
asserted, moreover, in Curtis v. Hubbard 2 that what "would be
breaking of the outer door in burglary, is equally breaking by the
sheriff."
Where forcible entry into a dwelling or a building within the
curtilage was lawful, the requirement of notice was usually thought to
obtain,'s but it was not mechanically applied. Notice was not re-
quired when it would be useless, 4 when it would constitute a senseless
ceremony, 5 when no one was evidently present to hear it,8 6 or when
the officer was invited into the house. 7 Notice was apparently not
required prior to entry into a nondwelling not within the curtilage. 8
The Connecticut case of Read v. Case 8 occupies a middle position
between the usual criminal or civil case. Finding that a bail, or a
sheriff acting in his behalf, may, after due demand, break and enter
to take a principal, the court carved an exception out of the general
requirement of announcement and held that the possibility of imminent
danger to human life obviated the necessity of notice. It seems that
Read, the principal, had asserted he would defend himself with a gun
if necessary. The court concluded that any other holding would be a
"palpable perversion" of an otherwise sound rule. Read v. Case is the
46 Fitch v. Loveland, Kir. 380 (Conn. 1788).
47 E.g., Stedman v. Crane, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 295 (1846); Hubbard v. Mace,
17 Johns. R. 127 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1819); William v. Spencer, 5 Johns. R. 352 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1810).
48 Haggerty v. Wilbur, 16 Johns. . 287 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819). In Stearns v.
Vincent, 50 Mich. 209, 15 N.W. 86 (1883), a case involving a store-dwelling, although
the court recognized the relevancy of cases involving burglary, it held that what might
be a dwelling for burglary would not necessarily be a dwelling entitled to the pro-
tection of the home.
49 Burton v. Wilkinson, 18 Vt 186 (1846).
50 Walker v. Fox, 32 Ky. 404 (1834).
51 Welsh v. Wilson, 34 Minn. 92, 24 N.W. 327 (1885).
821 Hill 336, 338 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841), aff'd, 4 Hill 437 (N.Y. 1842) (door
merely opened without other force).
3 Burton v. Wilkinson, 18 Vt. 186, 189 (1846).
54 Howe v. Butterfield, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 302 (1849) (dictum) (knowledge
that entry was to be forcibly resisted).
5Allen v. Martin, 10 Wend. 300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833) (reentry made to
recapture escaped prisoner).
56 Howe v. Butterfield, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 302 (1849).
5 7 Hitchcock v. Holmes, 43 Conn. 528 (1876) (overtones of stratagem, yet entry
still upheld).
58 See Haggerty v. Wilbur, 16 Johns. R. 287 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819); Burton v.
Wilkinson, 18 Vt 186, 189 (1846) (dictum).
594 Conn. 166 (1822).
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leading American decision articulating an exception to the general
requirement of announcement based on the possibility of peril.
American decisions also purported to follow the rule of Semayne's
Case in the execution of criminal arrest warrants. Decided in 1783,
Kelsy v. Wright ' is the first American case squarely to face the
problem of forcible entry in the context of a criminal warrant. The
case held that such an entry to execute a warrant for treason was
lawful. No question of due notice was presented to the court, how-
ever, since the officers did not in fact break in until admission was
refused after an announcement of purpose and a demand for entry. A
similar result was reached six years later in a case involving a warrant
for lewd behavior."' Explicitly purporting to follow Semayne's Case,
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Reynolds
broadly asserted:
The doctrine that a man's house is his castle, which
cannot be invaded in the service of process, was always
subject to the exception that the liberty or privilege of the
house did not exist against the King. It had no application,
therefore, to the criminal process."
The rule of announcement as such received little direct attention
in the early decisions involving arrest on a warrant. No case actually
held illegal an arrest on the grounds of inadequate notice. On the
contrary, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky observed in Hawkins v.
Commonwealth ' that no notice was required in criminal cases: "Such
disclosure . . . would in many cases defeat the very object in view,
by giving the offender notice of his danger, and an opportunity of
effecting his escape." 4 The usual situation, however, is illustrated by
601 Root 83 (Conn. 1783). The case also stands for the proposition that the
entry is lawful although the person sought is not found; it is sufficient that the
sheriff had good cause to suspect he was within the house. Accord, Hawkins v.
Commonwealth, 53 Ky. 395 (1854); Barnard v. Bartlett, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 501
(1852) (notice required).
,1 State v. Shaw, 1 Root 134 (Conn. 1789).
62 120 Mass. 190, 196 (1876) (misdemeanor warrant); accord, United States v.
Faw, 25 Fed. Cas. 1053 (No. 15079) (C.C.D.C. 1808). The principal case also
stands for the proposition that the party need not be found to justify the breaking
of another person's house if the officer has reasonable grounds for suspecting that
the party is within the house. Hale apparently was of a contrary view. 2 HALE,
PLEAS OF THE CROWN *116; accord, Hawkins v. Commonwealth, 53 Ky. 395 (1854).
However, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts had noted earlier, in Commonwealth
v. Irwin, 83 Mass. 587, 589-90 (1861), that Hale's view should be limited to cases
in which there is no reasonable suspicion that the party is within the house. The
principal case merely follows this dictum. It also holds that no notice of whom the
warrant is for need be given unless requested.
0 Hawkins v. Commonwealth, 53 Ky. 395 (1854).
64 Id. at 397. MuRFREE, SHmERFFs § 1163 (1884), moreover, terms the Hawkins
rule better in felony cases.
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Commonwealth v. Reynolds,"' in which announcement of identity and
purpose was made prior to forcible entry. The court observed:
Even in case of a misdemeanor, while it has been held
in some cases that, before breaking open the outer door, the
officer should demand admission, it is fully recognized in
all the cases, that, after such demand and its refusal, the
officer may lawfully enter by force .... "
Only a few early cases considered the right to break and enter to
make an arrest without a warrant. The Massachusetts Supreme Court
in McLennon v. Richardson,0 7 however, did at least offer broad dictum
on the question: "The authority of a constable to break open doors
and arrest without a warrant is confined to cases where treason or
felony has been committed, or there is an affray or a breach of the
peace in his presence." Other early cases generally supported this
observation. Forcible entry6 to protect a threatened wife, 9 to re-
capture an escaped prisoner, 70 or to arrest for an actual breach of the
peace was upheld."1 A forcible entry solely to search for crime, how-
ever, was condemned. 72
The question of forcible entry pursuant to a search warrant first
met judicial attention in America in Bell v. Clapp,"3 which was decided
by the New York Supreme Court in 1813. Following Lord Camden's
opinion in Entick v. Carrington,"4 the court held the search warrant
valid and affirmed the right of the executing officer, upon due demand,
to break and enter. The court commented that such warrants "would
be of little or no efficacy without this power attached to them." "
65 120 Mass. 190 (1876). See also Barnard v. Bartlett, 64 Mass. 501 (1852);
Jacobs v. Measures, 79 Mass. 74 (1859) ; State v. Smith, 1 N.H. 346 (1818).
66120 Mass. at 196.
6781 Mass. 74, 77 (1860). The case actually held unlawful an entry to arrest
for a mere liquor violation not amounting to an actual disturbance. The court
observed that the situation did not require "the immediate intervention of legal
authority" because of the "grave nature of the offense" or because an actual disturbance
of "the public peace" was occurring. Accord, Delafoile v. State, 54 N.J.L. 381, 24
Atl. 557 (Ct. Err. & App. 1892). Justice Knapp in the Delafoile decision adds the
situation where "there is a well founded belief of crime, and the officer goes in pursuit
of the criminal . . . ." Id. at 384, 24 AtI. at 558. It is not clear whether "crime"
means only felony and pursuit must be "fresh." See RESTATEmNT, TORTS §206,
comment f (N.J. Arnot. 1940).
68 The Massachusetts Supreme Court also affirmed the right of an officer to
enter through an open door, without warrant or permission, to arrest for a breach
of the peace. Ford v. Breen, 173 Mass. 52, 53 N.E. 136 (1899).
69 State v. Stouderman, 57 La. Ann. 286 (1851).
70 Cahill v. People, 106 Ill. 621 (1883).
71 State v. Lafferty, 5 Del. (5 Harr.) 491 (1854); accord, Commonwealth v.
Tobin, 108 Mass. 426 (1871).
72 Bailey v. Ragatz, 50 Wis. 554 (1880) (prostitution).
73 10 Johns. R. 263 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1813).
74 19 How. St Tr. 1030, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
75 Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. R. 263, 265 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813).
508 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Once again, however, the issue of announcement was not before the
court, since the officer had made an announcement. The Supreme
Court of Massachusetts in 1841 reached a like result in Common-
wealth v. Dana," and other early decisions expressed similar views."
One early case considered the question of forcible entry in the
context of the execution of a search warrant without an announcement,
but that case did not involve a dwelling. The Supreme Court of Maine
in Androscoggin R.R. v. Richards,7" upheld such an entry into a train
depot to execute a search warrant for liquor. The court offered this
cryptic observation: "There was no person in the depot, or around it,
at the time of its entry by the officer, from whom he could have de-
manded admission." "9 Although the courts usually dealt with the
question of announcement only in dicta, the formulation of the rule
was not inflexible. For example, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
in Jacobs v. Measures " spoke of "breaking the outer door of a dwell-
ing house, after demanding admittance and being refused," while the
same court in Barnard v. Bartlett"' had earlier seemed to require only
"notification of purpose" prior to such breaking.
III. MODERN AMERICAN STATUTES AND CASE LAW
During the last half century, a number of states and the federal
government have enacted statutes dealing with forcible entry." Thirty-
three states have statutes authorizing an officer to break and enter a
dwelling house or other building to make an arrest. Only nine ex-
pressly qualify that power when the officer is acting without a warrant,
while twenty grant it across the board. Usually, if qualified, the power
is limited to felony cases. Twenty-nine states and the federal govern-
ment have statutes authorizing forcible entry in the execution of
search warrants. Almost invariably the statutes condition the right
to break and enter upon due notice.83 None attempts to codify any
common-law exceptions.
7643 Mass. 329 (1841). This decision is also one of the first American cases
to reject the plea that illegally seized evidence be excluded in a criminal trial.
77 Chipman v. Bates, 15 Vt. 51 (1843) (no forcible entry); Beaty v. Perkins,
6 Wend. 382 (N.Y. 1831) (same).
7841 Me. 233 (1856).
79 Id. at 238.
80D79 Mass. 74, 75 (1859).
8164 Mass. 501, 503 (1852).
8 2 See Appendix A for a detailed analysis of the various statutes.
83 Only the Georgia statute does not expressly so condition the right. The pro-
vision, however, is "simply an attempted codification of the common law . .. ."
Hollinshed v. Shadrick, 95 Ga. App. 88, 90, 97 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1957). It probably
would be interpreted to include such a restriction. See Groves v. State, 175 Ga. 37,
41, 164 S.E. 822, 824 (1932).
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The last half century has also seen cases involving forcible entry
arise in a number of states 8 4 and in the federal courts.85  The range
of judicial treatment of the problem is best illustrated by decisions
from two jurisdictions: the District of Columbia and California.
84Alabama: Gray v. Williams, 230 Ala. 14, 160 So. 715 (1934) (need not men-
tion arrest warrant unless asked); Jones v. State, 4 Ala. App. 159, 58 So. 1011
(1912) (entry with search warrant without notice not illegal where no one present).
Arizona: Argetakis v. State, 24 Ariz. 599, 212 Pac. 372 (1923) (entry to arrest for
felony without notice or warrant upheld) ; Adair v. Williams, 24 Ariz. 422, 210 Pac.
853 (1922) (entry to arrest for misdemeanor without notice or warrant held illegal).
Florida: Johnson v. State, 157 Fla. 685, 27 So. 276, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 799
(1946) (forcible entry issue resolved by finding entry peaceful). Georgia: Groves v.
State, 175 Ga. 37, 164 S.E. 822 (1932) (entry with arrest warrant and notice upheld).
Indiana: Schreiber v. State, 201 Ind. 27, 164 N.E. 258 (1928) (entry to execute
search warrant after announcement of only identity upheld) ; Jones v. State, 89 Ind.
App. 564, 166 N.E. 158 (1929) (execution of search warrant without notice to pre-
vent destruction of evidence upheld). Kentucky: Stader v. Commonwealth, 302 Ky.
330, 194 S.W.2d 368 (1946) (entry to execute search warrant without notice upheld) ;
Weaver v. McGovern, 122 Ky. 1, 90 S.W. 984 (1906) (disturbance held to validate
entry to arrest without warrant). Maryland: Frankel v. State, 178 Md. 553, 16
A.2d 93 (1940) (notice of identity in execution of search warrant held sufficient);
Goodman v. State, 178 Md. 1, 11 A.2d 635 (1940) (dictum) (demand in execution
of search warrant need only be made where someone is present). Massachusetts:
Commonwealth v. Phelps, 209 Mass. 396, 95 N.E. 868 (1911) (entry to arrest for
suspicion of felony without warrant upheld). Mississippi: Love v. State, 142 Miss.
602, 107 So. 667 (1926) (entry to arrest for a felony without warrant and without
notice upheld). Michigan: People v. Woodward, 220 Mich. 511, 190 N.W. 721 (1922)
(entry to stop loud noise without warrant upheld). New York: Phelps v. McAdoo, 94
N.Y.S. 265 (Sup. Ct 1905) (dictum) (execution of search warrant must be with
notice). Oklahoma: Kelso v. State, 97 Okla. Crim. 215, 260 P.2d 864 (1953) (entry
with search warrant without notice upheld where inmate knew authority and purpose) ;
Thigpen v. State, 51 Okla. Crim. 28, 299 Pac. 230 (1931) (entry with search warrant
without notice upheld where no one present) ; accord, Pennington v. State, 302 P.2d
170 (Okla. 1956). Oregon: State v. Duffy, 135 Ore. 290, 295 Pac. 953 (1931)
(entry without notice or warrant to arrest for crime committed in presence upheld
vhere officer recognized inmate) ; State v. Yarde, 121 Ore. 297, 254 Pac. 798 (1927)
(dictum) (right to enter for felony without warrant upheld). Tennessee: Collins v.
State, 184 Tenn. 356, 199 S.W.2d 96 (1947) (execution of search warrant without
notice upheld where no one was present; dictum, that invalidity not grounds for
suppression); McCaslin v. McCord, 116 Tenn. 690, 94 S.W. 79 (1906) (private
person without warrant cannot enter to recapture prisoner). Texas: Condra v.
Anderson, 254 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (entry without notice to execute
search warrant not illegal); Booker v. State, 130 Tex. Crim. 460, 94 S.W.2d 75
(1936) (same) ; McGee v. State, 121 Tex. Crim. 188, 51 S.W.2d 714 (1932) (search
after entry to execute search warrant without notice upheld); Elms v. State, 114
Tex. Crim. 642, 26 S.W.2d 211 (1930) (entry without notice to execute search
warrant upheld when no one was present) ; Goodspeed v. State, 114 Tex. Crim. 334,
25 S.W.2d 858 (1929) (dictum) (entry should always be made only on usual formali-
ties) ; Justice v. State, 112 Tex. Crim. 586, 18 S.W.2d 657 (1929) (dictum) (entry
without notice to execute search warrant not grounds for suppressing evidence);
Kelley v. State, 80 Tex. Crim. 257, 190 S.W. 169 (1916) (entry by trick to arrest
for felony recognized if danger possible). Utah: State v. Williams, 49 Utah 320,
163 Pac. 1104 (1917) (entry to arrest for felony without a warrant and without
notice of purpose held valid where purpose understood). Wisconsin: Hiller v. State,
190 Wis. 369, 280 N.W. 260 (1926) (entry with search warrant but without notice
upheld where facts indicated admission refused), overruled on other grounds, Glo-
dowski v. State, 196 Wis. 265, 220 N.W. 227 (1928) ; Lehrer v. State, 183 Wis. 339,
197 N.W. 729 (1924) (valid execution of search warrant).
85 To arrest under a warrant: Townsend v. United States, 271 F.2d 445 (4th
Cir. 1959) (entry by postal inspector with valid search warrant upheld); United
States v. Petti, 168 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1948), vacated, 336 U.S. 916 (1949) (entry
by landlord with arrest warrant upheld) ; Lane v. United States, 148 F.2d 816 (5th
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 720 (1945) (seizure of still after entry with arrest
warrant upheld although party not found; state law not discussed) ; Paper v. United
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A. The District of Columbia
Cases presenting forcible entry problems arose in the District of
Columbia as early as 1808,6 but the question did not receive extended
judicial attention until 1949 when Accarino v. United States 87 was
decided. Accarino was forcibly arrested in his home without a war-
rant, and evidence of a gambling operation was seized at that time.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ordered the evi-
dence suppressed. Judge Prettyman's opinion found Accarino's arrest
illegal on two grounds: no exceptional circumstances which would
have authorized a forcible arrest without a warrant in his home were
shown; and prior to the forcible entry the arresting officers did not
announce their purpose. The opinion was based on a series of Supreme
Court decisions, chiefly McDonald v. United States,8 and an exten-
sive review of common-law cases and materials. The rationale which
Judge Prettyman derived from the Supreme Court's decisions, how-
States, 53 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1931) (same); United States v. Pappadementro, 6
Alaska 769 (1922) (entry with misdemeanor warrant without notice or reasonable
cause to think party was within house held unconstitutional).
To arrest without a warrant: Martin v. United States, 183 F.2d 436 (4th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 904 (1950) (entry to arrest without warrant or notice
held constitutional); Taylor v. United States, 55 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1932) (entry
upheld under power to arrest without warrant for crime in presence) ; United States
v. Colebrook, 52 F.2d 307 (S.D. Tex. 1931) (entry to arrest without warrant held
illegal under state law) ; Rouda v. United States, 10 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1926) (entry
to arrest without warrant for crime in presence upheld) ; McBride v. United States,
284 Fed. 416 (5th Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 614 (1922) (same; state law
discussed).
- To search under a warrant: Appell v. United States, 29 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1928)
(entry under invalid search warrant without notice upheld under power to arrest
without warrant; state law not discussed); Lee Kwong Nom v. United States, 20
F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1927) (search after entry into public place to execute search
warrant upheld under power to search incident to arrest without warrant); Mattus
v. United States, 11 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1926) (entry under invalid search warrant
with notice of authority upheld under power to arrest without warrant; state law
not discussed); United States v. Chin On, 297 Fed. 531 (D. Mass. 1924) (entry
with invalid search warrant upheld under power to arrest without warrant; state law
discussed) ; United States v. Freeman, 144 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1956) (execution
of search warrant with only notice of authority upheld under § 3109) ; United States
v. Bowman, 137 F. Supp. 385 (D.D.C. 1956) (entry through unlocked doors without
notice to execute search warrant upheld under § 3109; Barrientes v. United States,
235 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 879 (1956) (dictum) (failure
to give notice in execution of search warrant not grounds for suppression under
§ 3109); United States v. Freeman, supra (dictum) (same).
To search without a warrant: Here entry cases are usually resolved without
directly considering the issue of force. Such cases come under the general prohibition
of search without a warrant. See Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1931).
86United States v. Faw, 25 Fed. Cas. 1053 (No. 15079) (C.C.D.C. 1808) (right
to break doors to execute arrest warrant upheld). Wells v. Hubbard, 29 Fed. Cas.
657 (No. 17397) (C.C.D.C. 1822) (right similar to that upheld in Paw denied in
execution of civil writ). Neither decision mentioned the rule of announcement Coin-
pare Gibson v. United States, 149 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1945), with Beard v. United
States, 82 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
87179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
88335 U.S. 451 (1948) (entry to search and arrest without search or arrest
warrant held illegal).
[Voi.112:499
ANNOUNCEMENT AND UNLAWFUL ENTRY
ever, was almost immediately overturned.89 What Judge Prettyman
did in Accarino was to confuse the warrantless arrest with the warrant-
less search. He was therefore compelled to create an exception to what
he apparently thought was, or ought to be, the general rule-that
searches and arrests must always be on a warrant. His logic could
have forced him to hold that the warrantless arrest is always illegal
absent compelling circumstances. He limited his holding, however, to
89 Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U.S. 56, 67 (1950). Traditionally, if not
always rationally, Anglo-American law has drawn a sharp distinction between arrest
and search. See generally Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth
Amendment, in 1960 SuPREME CouRT Rnvmw 46 (Kurland ed.). The right to arrest
without a warrant was recognized prior to the development of the warrant procedures
and was never supplanted by them. Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant (pts. 1-2),
22 MicH. L. REv. 541, 548-50, 673, 685-89 (1924). Historically, arrest warrant pro-
cedures arose solely out of a desire to protect the arresting officer from tort liability.
STEPHENS, HISTORY OF THE CRmiNAL LAW OF ENGLAND 190-93 (1883). The right
to search without a warrant, however, received no such independent favorable de-
velopment. See generally LASsoN, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FoURTH
AMENDMENT 23-50 (1937).
This independent historical development has been reflected, although not always
with clarity or consistency, in the interpretation of the fourth amendment. The
warrantless search, for example, is usually unlawful. Taylor v. United States, 286
U.S. 1 (1932). Only the most limited exceptions to this rule have been recognized
-the automobile being the most notable illustration. See Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925). The amendment, of course, applies to arrests as well as
searches. Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 15 (1927). Yet Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948), the high water mark of the independent magistrate
rationale, explicitly rejected a rule which would have always required a warrant
prior to making an arrest.
Difficulties of interpretation and theory, on the other hand, arise when a search
is made incident to an arrest or an arrest is made as a pretext to search. The power
to search incident to an arrest is of ancient origin; it "goes back beyond doubt to
the days of the hue and cry." People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 196, 142 N.E. 583,
584 (1923) (Cardozo, J.). As such, it is "not to be doubted." Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925). Using regrettably broad language, however, the
Supreme Court in McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), and Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948), developed the rule that a warrant must be obtained whenever practicable
prior to making a search. So enthroned, the independent magistrate rule had a
short life. Two years later in Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), the
court specifically overruled Trupiano and substituted for the rule of the magistrate
the concept of "reasonableness." See generally Note, 28 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 664, 678-86(1961).
Despite the doctrinal differences expressed in this series of cases, it is important
to recognize that the underlying controversy actually centered not on the right to
search incident to an arrest, but on its justification and proper scope. To the degree
that Rabinowitz returned to the older rule of Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947) (four room apartment thoroughly searched), that scope is today highly per-
missive. How long it will remain so is open to question. See, e.g., Abel v. United
States, 362 U.S. 217, 237 (1960). It is probably only a matter of time until Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's masterful dissent in Rabinowitz becomes law. In fact, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter concurring in Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961),
expressed the view that the Court had by its decision quietly buried Rabinowitz.
It is also interesting and confusing to note that the Court still continues to speak
of search incident to arrest as an "exception." See, e.g., Rios v. United States, 364
U.S. 253, 261 (1960); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
The pretext arrest has provoked no similar conflict in the Court. An arrest
made to search is invariably thought illegal. See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz,
285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932) (dictum). The chief controversy in this area has not
centered on theoretical differences but on varying interpretations of the facts. See,
e.g., Jones v. United States, supra.
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requiring such circumstances only in the situation in which the arrest
is made in the home." Judge Prettyman concluded that the common
law supported his view that exceptional circumstances are required
before a warrantless arrest can be made in a house. However, the
judge's finding, if not in error, was at least strained. Most early
common-law authorities were primarily concerned with civil-law
aspects of forcible entry in the context of civil arrest or execution.9
Proper announcement arose only incidentally. Forcible entry and
announcement in the context of the administration of criminal justice
received little or no treatment. Moreover, Judge Prettyman explicitly
rejected the rule of the majority of American jurisdictions which
either by statute or decision follow Commonwealth v. Phelps,92 that
forcible entry to arrest without a warrant is legal. Accarino is also the
first judicial decision in Anglo-American law invalidating an arrest on
the independent ground that an announcement of purpose was not
made prior to forcible entry. 3  Judge Prettyman observed that the
common-law authorities expressed no disagreement on this point. A
more accurate description of these authorities is that they never really
considered the problem."
Despite the questionable character of Accarino," for the most
part it has been followed on the question of announcement and even
9oThe Supreme Court has never squarely dealt with this problem, although
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958), did present the question. Mr. Justice
Harlan resolved the issue, however, by finding that the entry was made to search
rather than to arrest. He observed that a nighttime forcible entry to arrest without
a warrant when there was ample time to obtain one presented "a grave constitutional
question." Id. at 499. Justices Clark and Burton in dissent would have squarely
met the problem; but they did not find the question so grave. Id. at 503. For the
English rule on this question, see Samuel v. Payne, 1 Doug. 359, 99 Eng. Rep. 230(K.B. 1780) (arrest without warrant in home upheld when arresting officer had
reason to believe felony was being committed).
91 See text accompanying notes 7-40 supra.
92209 Mass. 396, 95 N.E. 868 (1911).
93 The officers only announced, "Police." Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d
456, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
94 His only support on this point is Chitty, who observed that "where the law
is silent, and express principles do not apply, this extreme violence is illegal." CHrrrv,
CRIMINAL LAw *52. It should also be pointed out in Judge Prettyman's favor that
Accarino was decided prior to the Rabinowitz rejection of the rationale of McDonald.
The arrest to search factor present in Accarino may also have moved him to an
otherwise unsound decision.
95 Smith v. United States, 254 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937
(1958), and Washington v. United States, 263 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 1002 (1959), are difficult to reconcile with the exceptional circumstances
holding of Accarino. A close reading of Smith indicates that Judge Bastian only
gave lip service to Accarino when he permitted the introduction of oral statements
made after an entry without a warrant or exceptional circumstances. The opinion
is also unfaithful to Neuslein v. United States, 115 F.2d 690 (D.C. Cir. 1940), on
the oral statements point. In that case, then-Judge Vinson held that oral statements
heard by officers after an illegal entry in violation of the Fourth Amendment were
inadmissible even if voluntarily made. See Jackson v. United States, 302 F.2d 194
(D.C. Cir. 1962), which appears to have finally eliminated the exceptional circum-
stances rule.
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extended beyond its immediate facts. The court in Gatewood v.
United States9 applied the Accarino rule of notice, at least alterna-
tively, to a forcible entry made without announcement to execute a
bench warrant. The Government attempted to distinguish the facts
of Accarino on a warrant-no-warrant basis. The court rejected the
distinction terming the difference "immaterial." 'I
For a number of years the execution of search warrants in the
District of Columbia has been governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3109, which
is a federal statute of general application.9" It grants the right to
break and enter to execute a search warrant when admission is re-
fused after due notice. Prior to 1958, only a few reported cases
considering the meaning of the statute arose. Mattus v. United States 99
had, however, held that the precodification form of section 3109 did
not invalidate an entry made both to arrest on probable cause without
a warrant and to serve an invalid search warrant. The officers had
forced an entrance after receiving no response to an announcement of
identity only. Under section 3109, as it was later codified, Judge
Holtzoff, also upheld a similar entry,100 commenting: "[T]he an-
nouncement that the police were seeking to enter would give notice to
a reasonable person that the purpose of seeking the entry is either to
make an arrest or to make a search and that it was not just a social
visit." Chief Judge Laws in United States v. Bowman'' likewise up-
held an entry, under section 3109, although no announcement was made,
on the ground that no "breaking" was involved. He limited the statute
to the forcible entry situation. 2
Prior to 1958, motions to suppress under section 3109 had also
reached the appellate level. Both the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
had considered the effect of a possible violation of the statute. The
Fifth Circuit observed in Barrientes v. United States.. that, "while
96209 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (ruse to get door open with force).
1971d. at 791. The court also held that even if the existence of a warrant made
a difference no warrant was outstanding.
9SThe substance of 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1958) was originally in the Espionage
Act of 1917, ch. 30, tit. XI, § 8, 40 Stat. 229. It "was based upon the New York law
on this subject." H.R. REP. No. 69, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 20; 55 CONG. REc. 3305,
3307 (1917). Interestingly enough, the New York cases prior to 1958 had never
considered the application of their statutory announcement rule. The best that can
be said for the New York practice generally is that it was supposed to reflect the
common law. See People v. Kemper, 208 N.Y. 16, 20-23, 101 N.E. 794, 796-97 (1913).
99 11 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1926).
100 United States v. Freeman, 144 F. Supp. 669, 670 (D.D.C. 1956).
101 137 F. Supp. 385 (D.D.C. 1956).
102 The Chief judge cited Ellison v. United States, 206 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir.
1953), in which judge Washington upheld a peaceful entry to arrest on probable
cause without a warrant
103 235 F.2d 116, 117 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 879 (1956).
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the use of excessive, that is unnecessary, force is in any case to be
deprecated, evidence under a valid warrant is not thereby made in-
admissible." The District of Columbia Circuit, however, reached a
contrary result in Woods v. United States,'0 ' where a search warrant
for gambling paraphernalia was executed by forcing open a door with-
out an announcement. Relying on the language of section 3109 (by
use of a negative pregnant) and a prior civil case,0 5 Judge Burger
found the entry illegal and ordered the evidence suppressed.
B. The Rule in California
Forcible entry to make an arrest is governed by statute in
California. Section 844 of the California Penal Code provides in
part: "To make an arrest . . . a peace officer . . .may break open
the door . . . after having demanded admittance and explained the
purpose for which admittance is desired." The two leading cases
interpreting this section are People v. Martin 0 and People v.
Maddox ' decided by the California Supreme Court in 1955 and
1956. Martin was arrested twice by the Los Angeles police for book-
making. There was no forcible entry during the first arrest. The
second arrest took place in the following fashion. One officer looked
through a window and saw Martin making book. He raised the
window, identified himself, and asked Martin to open the door. When
Martin did not, the officer entered and made the arrest. It was con-
tended on appeal that the arrest was unlawful under section 844.
Justice Traynor's answer was straightforward. A statement of pur-
pose is not required where the purpose is "reasonably apparent." He
found it immaterial, moreover, that the identification took place after,
not before, the window was raised.
The Maddox arrest took place in a somewhat similar fashion.
Having probable cause to arrest for a narcotics violation, an Oakland
police officer went to Maddox's home and knocked on the door. He
then heard retreating footsteps and a voice say, "Wait a minute." The
officer immediately kicked the door open and caught Maddox running
toward the bedroom with narcotics paraphernalia in his hands. It was
104 240 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 941 (1957).
105 Palmer v. King, 41 App. D.C. 419 (1914) (entry with force to execute a
writ of replevin held illegal). It is interesting that Judge Burger could find no
difference between the possible application of the rule in civil and criminal cases.
Woods v. United States, 240 F.2d 37, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
106 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
10746 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858 (1956); see People v.
Carswell, 51 Cal. 2d 602, 335 P.2d 99 (1959) (entry by use of key to make arrest
after no response to announcement of identity upheld, although no one was present) ;
People v. Hammond, 54 Cal. 2d 846, 357 P2d 289, 9 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1960) (narcotic
addict in possession of gun; court noted danger and possibility of evidence destruction).
See generally FRUcKE, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL EVIDEN CE 432-33 (5th ed. 1960).
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contended on appeal that the arrest was illegal under section 844. All
parties conceded that there had been no demand for admission or ex-
planation of purpose.
In Maddox, unlike Martin, the court had to consider squarely the
effect of a failure to comply with the express terms of the statute. Re-
fusing to order the evidence suppressed, Justice Traynor pointed out
that when the right to invade an individual's privacy is clearly ap-
parent, there is no compelling need for strict compliance with the
requirement of announcement to protect basic constitutional guar-
antees.08 He also recognized the inherent difficulty in demonstrating
the causal relation between failure to announce and a subsequent seizure
of evidence.'0 9 Ultimately, however, his opinion rested on the simple
proposition that section 844 was a codification of the common law and
was subject to the common-law qualifications."0  He held that an
announcement under section 844 is excused when an officer believes in
good faith that it would increase the possibility of peril, facilitate an
escape, or result in the destruction of evidence which would otherwise
be seized.
Under the destruction of evidence exception announced in Maddox,
the lower appellate courts in California had, prior to 1958, upheld a
number of convictions on evidence which otherwise would have been
burned up,"" ground up,"' or flushed away."8 It was also held that a
10 sHe felt that no basic constitutional right was involved when an officer suc-
ceeds in getting where he is entitled to be more quickly than if he had made an
announcement under CAL. Pm. CODE § 844. People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301,
306, 294 P.2d 6, 9, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858 (1956).
109 Illegal conduct unrelated and collateral to the obtaining of evidence in ques-
tion will not affect its admissibility in California. See People v. Boyles, 45 Cal. 2d
652, 290 P.2d 535 (1955).
110 At this point Justice Traynor relied on RESTATEm T, TORTS § 206, comment d
(1934) which provides:
Since under ordinary circumstances it is reasonable to give the possessor
[of property] an opportunity to permit the actor to enter peaceably and thus
avoid the danger of harm to the premises and risk of the actor's use of force
to the person, it is usually a prerequisite to making a forcible entry into a
dwelling that the actor shall first explain his errand and make demand upon
the possessor to permit him to enter and make the arrest or other apprehen-
sion. Upon refusal of such demand, or if no refusal be made by word or act
upon the expiration of a reasonable time, the privilege to effectuate a forcible
entry arises. Such reasonable time would ordinarily be very brief.
If for any reason an explanation of his errand and demand for admittance
by the actor are or reasonably appear to him to be impracticable, as where
such explanation and demand would tend to frustrate or to make such more
dangerous to life or limb the arrest or other apprehension, the above require-
ments may be dispensed with.
111 People v. Hudak, 149 Cal. App. 2d 88, 307 P.2d 942 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957)
(bookmaking).
112 People v. Moore, 140 Cal. App. 2d 870, 295 P.2d 969 (Dist. Ct App. 1956)
(bookmaking).
113 People v. Steinberg, 148 Cal. App. 2d 855, 307 P.2d 634 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957)
(bookmaking).
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prior criminal record might establish a possibility of peril to justify
entry without announcement." 4 Interestingly enough, of the thirteen
reported arrest cases during this period, all but two dealt with narcotics
or gambling violations." 5
California also apparently follows the general rule that entry by
trick or subterfuge does not constitute a "breaking." "1
IV. MILLER V. UNITED STATES
A. The Facts
Just what happened at the door of "Blue" Miller's apartment will
probably never be known. The whole episode could only have in-
volved a few seconds. Following the arrest of "Bessie" Byrd's
seventeen-year-old brother, police officers 17 went to Byrd's and Mil-
ler's Washington apartment intending to arrest them. Miller and
Byrd were wholesale narcotics dealers, and Byrd's brother was one of
their peddlers. Arriving at the apartment, one of the officers knocked
on the door, and in a low voice replied-"Police"-to the inquiry-
"Who's there?". Miller then opened the door slightly on an attached
night chain. When he saw the officers he started to close the door."'
114 See People v. Ramsey, 157 Cal. App. 2d 178, 320 P.2d 593 (Dist. Ct App.
1958) (one prior conviction and one prior release with high bail at time of arrest) ;
People v. Potter, 144 Cal. App. 2d 350, 300 P.2d 889 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (four pre-
vious robberies and one escape conviction).
35 People v. Cahill, 163 Cal. App. 2d 15, 328 P.2d 995 (Dist Ct. App. 1958)
(narcotics) ; People v. Miller, 162 Cal. App. 2d 96, 328 P.2d 128 (Dist. Ct. App.
1958) (narcotics) ; People v. Ramsey, 157 Cal. App. 2d 178, 320 P.2d 592 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1958) (abortion) ; People v. Morris, 157 Cal. App. 2d 81, 320 P.2d 67 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 935 (1959) (narcotics) ; People v. Barnett, 156
Cal. App. 2d 803, 320 P.2d 128 (Dist Ct. App. 1958) (narcotics) ; People v. Sakelaris,
154 Cal. App. 2d 244, 315 P.2d 902 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (bookmaking) ; People v.
Ferrera, 149 Cal. App. 2d 850, 309 P.2d 533 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (bookmaking) ;
People v. Guerrera, 149 Cal. App. 2d 133, 307 P.2d 940 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (nar-
cotics) ; People v. Hudak, 149 Cal. App. 2d 88, 307 P.2d 942 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957)
(bookmaking) ; People v. Steinberg, 148 Cal. App. 2d 855, 307 P.2d 634 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1957) (bookmaking) ; People v. Potter, 144 Cal. App. 2d 350, 300 P.2d 889 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1956) (armed robbery) ; People v. Moore, 140 Cal. App. 2d 870, 295 P.2d
969 (Dist. Ct App. 1956) (bookmaking); People v. Sayles, 140 Cal. App. 2d 657,
295 P.2d 579 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (narcotics).
316 See People v. Scott, 170 Cal. App. 2d 446, 339 P.2d 162 (Dist. Ct. App.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 937 (1960) ; People v. Lawrence, 149 Cal. App. 2d 435,
308 P.2d 162 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
117 The group of officers included members of the Metropolitan Washington
Police Department, Federal Bureau of Narcotics agents, and two narcotic trainees
of the Virginia State Police. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 303 n.1 (1958).
118 During the trial the officer testified he also said at this point, "Police, you
are under arrest, we want in." It would have been proper, in view of this testimony,
to remand the case for reconsideration by the trial judge. See Masiello v. United
States, 304 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1962). But neither on appeal nor certiorari was
this course of action urged by the Government. The Supreme Court apparently took
the position that the Government was willing to have the case decided solely on the
pretrial record which did not include the trial statement. 357 U.S. at 304 n.3.
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One officer immediately grabbed the door and forced it open by break-
ing the night chain. The officers had neither search nor arrest war-
rants. Miller and Byrd were arrested and marked informant money
was found when the apartment was searched.
A pretrial motion to suppress the money was denied." 9 The
trial judge refused to reconsider the question of suppression, and
Miller and Byrd were duly found guilty of violating the narcotics
laws.2  The conviction was affirmed on appeal ' and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.2 2
B. Argument of Counsel for Miller
Miller's appeal was made in forma pauperis. The main proposi-
tion of his brief was that breaking and entering without notice of
purpose was illegal and in violation of the fourth amendment.M He
began his argument by stating that the chief purpose of the entry into
Miller's apartment was to search for the marked informant money.124
He then drew the Court's attention to section 3109. Recognizing that
section 3109 by its terms applied to search warrants, Miller advanced
the proposition that it would be "illogical and unreasonable" to sup-
pose that Congress had intended a lesser standard to obtain when an
entry was made without a warrant, albeit to arrest."25
Miller did not, however, end his argument at that point. He
suggested that if section 3109 was inapplicable, the case should be
decided under United States v. Di Re 126 on the basis of the law of the
District of Columbia, the place where the arrest occurred.' This
argument brought into play Accarino v. United States'2 and its
progeny. The remainder of the brief on this point merely reviewed
these authorities.2 9 Miller concluded with the suggestion that since
"19 Judge Holtzoff heard the motion to suppress. He found the arrest adequately
supported by probable cause. He ruled, therefore, that the arrest and incidental
search were legal. Record, p. 34. The question of announcement was not argued
in the motion.
120 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1958); 70 Stat. 570 (1956), 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1958); 68
Stat. 1004 (1954), 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) (1958).
121 Shepherd v. United States, 244 F.2d 750 (D.C. Cir. 1956), reed sub nom.
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
122 353 U.S. 957 (1957).
12 Brief for Petitioner, p. 18. The brief also presented the arrest as a pretext
to permit search argument, citing such cases as Henderson v. United States, 12 F.2d
528 (4th Cir. 1926), and the standard pretext language from United States v. Lef-
kowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932).
124 Brief for Petitioner, p. 18.
M Id. at 23-24.
126 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
127 Brief for Petitioner, p. 24.
128 179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
129 Brief for Petitioner, pp. 25-28.
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the law provided no sanction against the officer, one must be assessed
against the Government.' For this point, he relied on People v.
Cahan,'3' the case in which the California Supreme Court first adopted
the exclusionary rule for the express reason of deterring unlawful
search and seizure, and Nueslein v. District of Columbia.3 His part-
ing word was that, since the evidence was secured "as a result of" the
illegal action, it must be suppressed.3 3
C. Argument of Counsel for the United States
Contrary to Miller's counsel, the Government viewed the basic
question to be one of probable cause.13 4  It proceeded to show that the
officer had probable cause, and therefore the right to make an arrest
without a warrant, and that an immediate arrest in Miller's apartment
was justified-3 5 To support its position the Government relied on
cases such as Trupiano v. United States. 6 and Brinegar v. United
States.3 7  Johnson v. United States 138 and McDonald v. United
States '3 9 were distinguished since the entering officers in those cases
did not have probable cause to arrestY.4 °  Having thus established the
right to arrest-at least to its own satisfaction-the Government moved
on to consider the question of the forcible entry.
The Government first attempted to show the existence of the
right to enter by force. The federal and state cases on the issue were
reviewed and cited at length. 4' Accarino v. United States 42 and
other similar cases were treated as dealing primarily with subterfuge
searches. 4 ' Inexplicably, the Government began its answer to Miller's
argument on the issue of notice by agreeing "that the validity of the
entry should be tested under the standard of 18 U. S. C. 3109." 144
It disagreed, however, that "the arresting officers did not comply with
the terms of the statute." 141 Initially, the Government noted that the
130 Id. at 29.
13144 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
132115 F.2d 690 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
133 Brief for Petitioner, p. 30.
134 Brief for Respondent, p. 12.
13 Id. at 13-18.
136 334 U.S. 699 (1948), cited in Brief for Respondent, p. 13.
'37 338 U.S. 160 (1949), cited in Brief for Respondent, p. 16.
1-38 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
139 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
140 Brief for Respondent, p. 17.
141 Id. at 19.
142 179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
'43 Brief for Respondent, p. 21.
144 Id. at 23.
34 Ibid.
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officers had identified themselves as police. The issue was thus nar-
rowed to the question of whether the circumstances themselves gave
adequate notice of purpose.148 The Government argued that when
"split-second action is necessary, the law does not require an ex-
tended exposition of the obvious." 147 The Government relied on pre-
vious events of the evening and the very fact of police presence to
support the inference of knowledge already possessed. The dictum in
Accarino v. United States"4 was cited for the proposition that an-
nouncement and refusal was not necessary when it was already under-
stood.'49 Finally, the Government sought'8 0 to sustain the search by
placing it within the search incident to an arrest category under United
States v. Rabinowitz.'
Since the Government had conceded that section 3109 controlled
the arrest, and had asserted that an adequate announcement had been
made, no attention was given to an independent formulation of the
requirements of notice, either under the law of the District of Columbia
or the fourth amendment, nor was attention given to possible excep-
tions to the general rule, or appropriate sanctions when the rule,
whatever its source, was not obeyed.
D. Sources of the Standard and Remedy
It is important to recognize that Miller presented more than just
a problem of formulating a substantive rule dealing with announce-
ment and entry. Almost as significant would be the grounds on which
the Court would base the rule and the remedy it would fashion. Gen-
erally speaking, the Court had four options in choosing the source.
Each would have varying consequences.
1. The Fourth Amendment
Analytically and abstractly, the fourth amendment consists of two
separate clauses.82 The first comprehensively subjects searches and
146 Id. at 24-25. The Government also noted that there was testimony at the trial
that identity and purpose were expressly announced and that the court of appeals
could have passed on the whole record. The question, however, apparently was not
brought to the Court's attention as a ground for decision. Id. at 25 n.11.
14T Id. at 26.
148 179 F2d 456, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
149 Brief for Respondent, p. 26.
150 Id. at 27-29.
11339 U.S. 56 (1950).
15 The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
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seizures to a rule of reasonableness; the second sets out in detail
specific requirements for the issuance of warrants. As such, the
amendment represents an overriding commitment to a fundamental
limitation on official power to arrest, search, and seize.'53
That the Supreme Court had not by 1958 squarely considered
a question of entry is indeed surprising. It had considered such diverse
aspects of arrest, search, and seizure as the waivable character of rights
the amendment was designed to secure,'54 the character of the indi-
viduals who could 15 or could not 156 violate its provisions, the nature
of probable cause 157 and its duration in time,' the specificity of the
description of the person "9 to be seized or the place 160 to be searched,
the nature of the prohibited invasion,'' the kinds 162 and quantity'3
of seizable property, the area or areas within 164 and outside '65 its pro-
tection, and the nature ' 66 and scope' 67 of the remedy to be applied for
a violation of its mandate.
153 That each clause of the amendment should be read separately was not clear
until United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), in which the Supreme Court
worked a fundamental change in fourth amendment theory. The amendment, which
had previously been tacitly viewed as always requiring a warrant, was no longer
subject to historical "exceptions" such as the warrantless search incident to an arrest,
or a similar search of an automobile; the exceptions were to be drawn into the
reasonableness clause itself. See generally Note, Search and Seizure in the Supreme
Court: Shadows on the Fourteenth Amnendnent, 28 U. CHI. L. R,.. 664, 678-86
(1961), and cases and authorities cited therein. See also Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427, 454-55 (1963) (Breunan, J., dissenting).
1-4 See, e.g., Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927) (defects in arrest
warrant held waived).
15 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (application held limited to
federal officers), overruled, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (state
search held subject to federal rule for use in federal court).
156 See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (private seizure held
outside scope of fourth amendment).
157 See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (described as non-
technical, reasonable concept).
158 See, e.g., Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932) (evidence must be fresh).
1-9 See, e.g., West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78 (1894) (must be sufficiently definite).
160 See, e.g., Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925) (description held
sufficiently definite).
161 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (limited to physical
intrusion).
162 See, e.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309-10 (1921) (mere evi-
dentiary items not subject to seizure).
163 See, e.g., Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957) (seizure of contents
of whole house excessive).
164 See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932) (garage included).
165 See, e.g., Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (abandoned property
in open field excluded).
166 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (illegally seized
evidence suppressible).
107 See, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)
(evidence suppressible if secured through use of illegally seized evidence).
[Voi.112:499
ANNOUNCEMENT AND UNLAWFUL ENTRY
The relationship between the castle maxim, as expanded,' 68 and
the amendment was obvious. The Supreme Court itself had, for ex-
ample, approved Thomas Cooley's 1868 observation '6 9 that the maxim
was part and parcel of the amendment. 70 It is therefore difficult to
see how, under the rationale of Rabinowitz, 7' it could realistically be
contended that the manner of entry was outside the limitation of rea-
sonableness in the first clause of the amendment. Nevertheless, the
closest the Court had come to the question was the dictum of Mr.
Justice Bradley in Boyd v. United States' 72 that breaking was but a
"circumstance of aggravation" in an unlawful search and seizure. Like
Cooley's observation, this dictum was potentially significant. What
could be a "circumstance of aggravation" surely ought to be subjected
to definite limitations.1 3
Similar language also appears in Rochin v. California ' 74 in which
the Court was faced with a search and seizure question under the
fourteenth amendment. Yet, as the ultimate issue in Rochin aptly
illustrated, if the decision were rested on the fourth amendment, rami-
fications beyond the immediate case had to be considered. What effect
would a rule based on the fourth amendment have on the states?
Wolf v. Colorado had held that the core concept of privacy of the
amendment was applicable against the state under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.1 5  What relation would this con-
cept have to announcement and entry? Would the decision have the
normal retroactive effects of most constitutional decisions? Would it
be better to rest the decision on a basis which could, without funda-
mental implications, be changed or altered either by the Court itself
or Congress as practical experience was acquired? The Court had
taken a nonconstitutional course in Jencks v. United States 176 and
168 Unquestionably, the castle maxim has come to stand for a pervasive commit-
ment to privacy. Historically, however, it had no such broad meaning; it was, for
the most part, limited to the question of lawful entry in the context of the admin-
istration of the civil law.
16 9 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LI!iTATIoNs 611 (8th ed. 1927).
170 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914).
171339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950).
172 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (dictum).
173 On the other hand, if a breaking was only a "circumstance of aggravation"
did it not, therefore, assume an otherwise unlawful entry? And, if so, would breaking
alone be a legally cognizable injury to some "right"?
174 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
175 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (dictum). The Wolf decision was overruled sub-
sequently in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Under Wolf only the substantive
right of privacy extended through the fourteenth amendment to the states. Under
Mapp both the right and the remedy of suppression under the fourth amendment have
been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, and under Ker v. California the
standard of the fourth amendment is now also enforceable against the states.
176 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
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Congress had immediately enacted a comprehensive statute to regulate
the production of investigative reports, an action the Court could not
do in the context of a single case.' Finally, of course, there was
always the familiar injunction of prudence that constitutional decisions
ought to be avoided when there is an independent basis for the
decision.1
7 8
2. 18 U.S.C. § 3109
It was also possible for the Court to use section 3109 as the basis
of the decision. The statute, by its terms, applied only to search war-
rants, but the Court could have extended it to any breaking in which
property was seized. Such a ruling would create a uniform standard
applicable to federal arrests made anywhere in the United States and
would eliminate the distinction between the execution of search war-
rants and the making of an arrest. By relying on a statute, the Court
would leave Congress the opportunity of enacting comprehensive leg-
islation based on further experience. Finally, such a decision would
not effect state procedure, nor would it necessarily pose problems of
retroactivity.
3. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provided a similar
basis on which to rest the decision. Contrary to what might have
been expected, the rules were silent on this question. Rule 57(b),
however, provided: "If no procedure is specially prescribed by rule,
the court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with
these rules or with any applicable statute." Prior to the adoption of
the rules, it was the usual custom to conform federal procedure to
state procedure; this rule was designed to guarantee that such a prac-
tice would no longer prevail. 79  Although it could be argued that the
question of announcement and entry was not within the intent of the
rule, at least one authoritative treatise had observed that rule 57(b)
was intended to apply to arrests.'8s Using rule 57(b) would be
preferable to resting the decision on section 3109 since it would achieve
much the same result without the strained construction required to
use that section.
177 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958).
178 E.g., Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 338 (1955).
179 See FED. R. CRIm. P. 57(b), Advisory Committee note; cf. United States v.
Ewing, 140 U.S. 142 (1891).
180 WH AN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDuRE 22 (1950).
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4. State Procedure
It was also possible for the Court to follow the broad principle
announced by Mr. Justice Jackson in United States v. Di Re: 181
We believe, however, that in absence of an applicable
federal statute the law of the state where an arrest without
warrant takes place determines its validity. By one of the
earliest acts of Congress, the principle of which is still re-
tained, the arrest by judicial process for a federal offense must
be "agreeable to the usual mode of process against offenders
in such state." There is no reason to believe that state law
is not an equally appropriate standard by which to test
arrests without warrant, except in those cases where Con-
gress has enacted a federal rule. Indeed the enactment of a
federal rule in some specific cases seems to imply the absence
of any general federal law of arrest.182
Under Di Re the controlling law is that of the place where an
arrest is made. The law of the District of Columbia would therefore,
apply to Miller's arrest. The chief vice here, however, is that the
question of entry for federal arrest and searches would be subjected to
the varying and uncertain standards of state law.
5. The Remedy
Assuming the Court held the entry to be improper, the most
obvious remedy was to suppress the improperly obtained evidence.1'3
Although English law had left the debtor with only an action in
trespass," 4 the "suppression sanction" had been used in entry situa-
tions in early American law. In 1831, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court in Ilsley v. Nichols held invalid a civil attachment perfected by
an unlawful forcible entry on the ground that any other decision
"would afford a direct encouragement to the rash and turbulent
creditor to violate the rules of law . ... ," 18 In People v. Hub-
bard,"' in which New York adopted the Ilsley rule, Judge Cowen
forcefully observed: "It is idle and absurd to talk of the privilege [of
the house], unless it be enforced by adequate sanctions."
The Supreme Court, however, was squarely faced with one of its
own decisions which pointed away from suppressing the evidence. In
181332 U.S. 581 (1948).
182 I d. at 589-90. (Emphasis added.)
183 The possibility of something like a contempt citation is so unlikely that it
does not merit discussion.
184 See, e.g., Percival v. Stamp, 9 Ex. 167, 156 Eng. Rep. 71 (1853) (civil exe-
cution on personal property).
18529 Mass. 270, 277 (1831).
186 24 Wend. 369, 373 (N.Y. 1840) ; accord, Baily v. Wright, 39 Mich. 96 (1878).
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McGuire v. United States,'87 prohibition agents had destroyed part of
the liquor they had otherwise lawfully seized and the Court refused
to suppress the retained liquor as a sanction to enforce a statute making
it a crime to willfully execute a warrant with "unnecessary severity." 18
Mr. Justice Stone observed that the unlawful destruction had "at
most a remote and artificial bearing upon the right of the government
to introduce in evidence" 189 what was otherwise retained. He com-
mented that a "criminal prosecution is more than a game in which the
Government may be checkmated and the game lost merely because its
officers have not played according to rule." 190
McGuire was closely related to Miller. Unlawful force at the
door would be difficult to distinguish from unlawful force after entry, 1'
and there is no logical connection between the seizure of evidence and
violent entry. The rule under section 3109, or section 3109 itself,
does not appear to be of a higher order than 18 U.S.C. § 2234.192
The principle of section 2234, however, might be distinguished from
the principle of section 3109 on the grounds of an existing criminal
penalty and the requirement of willfulness. Or the Court might find
a new rationale for the rule of section 3109 different from the obvious
violence rationale of section 2234.
E. The Court's Opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan quickly narrowed the issues before the
Court to the sole question of proper announcement. Before discussing
this issue, however, he set out the source of the law against which the
entry was to be judged and explained why the Court wanted to decide
the Miller case. Relying on United States v. Di Re, 9' he held that
the validity of Miller's arrest must be determined "by reference to the
law of the District of Columbia." '1 He justified the Court's review
of what, under this holding, would have been purely a local question
on the ground that the criteria of the local rule dealing with arrests
were "identical with those embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 3109, which deals
187273 U.S. 95 (1927).
188 Id. at 98 n.1 ; Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, tit. XI, § 21, 40 Stat 230.
189 McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 98 (1927).
190 Id. at 99.
191 The thrust of McGuire is against suppression as an indirect sanction to enforce
compliance with a criminal statute applicable to law-enforcement agents. Clearly,
this aspect of McGuire could not be avoided, yet that the illegality occurred after
the seizure and not prior thereto could have served as a basis for avoiding the naked
holding of McGuire.
192 Note 188 supra.
193 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
194357 U.S. at 306.
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with entry to execute a search warrant." 195 Section 3109, he pointed
out, is not "confined in operation to the District of Columbia . , 198
Having thus set the stage, Mr. Justice Brennan began his sub-
stantive discussion with a short review of early common-law authori-
ties, noting their disagreement on the right, without a warrant, to break
doors to arrest on suspicion of a felony. He then emphasized, how-
ever, that there was no disagreement among the early writers that an
announcement of authority and purpose was a prerequisite to the right
to break and enter 197 and that this rule was reflected today in the
statutes of a number of states.""8 He also referred to some of the
state decisions ' holding that there are exceptions to the general rule,
although he recognized that the existence of the exceptions was not
before the Court.
According to Mr. Justice Brennan, the rule seemed "to require
notice in the form of an express announcement . . . of . . . pur-
pose . . . ,, 200 He immediately recognized, however, that there
might be "facts known" to the officers which would justify them in
being "virtually certain" that such an explicit statement would be a
"useless gesture." 20 For the remainder of the opinion, Mr. Justice
Brennan considered the application of the "virtual certainty" test of
the facts before the Court. He concluded that at best the officer could
only have been sure Miller knew there were police at his door con-
ducting an investigation. This, he said, fell short of the requirements
of the rule. After paying lip service to the needs of society in enforc-
ing the criminal law, he went on to hold that the absence of an an-
nouncement of purpose made the entry and the arrest illegal; the
evidence, therefore, had to be suppressed. Twice 202 Mr. Justice Bren-
nan referred to the interest protected by the rule as "privacy," yet he
did not elaborate on how the right of privacy was involved in the case.
The opinion never dealt specifically with the issue of force nor ex-
plained why the evidence had to be suppressed. 0 3
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid.
197 A better statement would, of course, be that they had never directly considered
the question.
198 357 U.S. at 308.
199 357 U.S. at 309, citing Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822), and People v.
Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6 (1956).
200 357 U.S. at 309.
201 357 U.S. at 310, citing People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955),
and Wilgus, Arrest Without A Warrant, 22 MIcH. L. REv. 541, 798-802 (1924).
202 357 U.S. at 307, 313.
203 "This result can be defended only on the conceptual ground that the breaking
invalidates the arrest and that the lack of a lawful arrest makes the search uncon-
stitutional." Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law,
49 CAL. L. REv. 474, 501-02 (1961).
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Mr. Justice Harlan concurred only in the result. Justices Clark
and Burton dissented. The crux of Mr. Justice Clark's opinion was
that the local rule prior to Miller would not have required an express
announcement of purpose in these circumstances. He felt the Court's
reading of the facts and the law was an unjustifiable interference in
local law hardly warranted by the purported similarity between the
local rule and the general federal statute. He also objected to what
he termed the Court's acceptance of the Government's "concession"
that "the entry must be tested by a federal statute . .. 204
F. Conclusions
Several tentative conclusions may be drawn from Mr. Justice
Brennan's opinion:
(1) The decision stood as a question of District of Columbia law.
Neither the fourth amendment nor 18 U.S.C. § 3109 were directly
involved despite the dissent's loose language on the latter point. Cases
arising outside of the District involving no-announcement arrests
would, therefore, be handled as a question of state law under Di Re.
(2) The rule in the District for arrests, and more than likely
under section 3109 for searches there and elsewhere, was that an ex-
plicit statement of "identity" and "purpose" would have to be made
prior to entering.
(3) No statement of purpose, or perhaps identity, need be made
when facts known to the officers made it "virtually certain" that both
their identity and purpose was already known.
(4) The broad rule was perhaps subject to qualification when
the officers believe in good faith that there was danger of bodily harm,
escape, or the destruction of evidence. It was not clear whether the
''virtual certainty" test would control a finding of good faith.
(5) Evidence seized after an unlawful entry in a search incident
to an arrest will be suppressed. McGuire v. United States2 o5 was
placed in a judicial limbo. Whether it was silently overruled or dis-
tinguished could only be established by future litigation.
(6) For the Court, the principle of section 3109, and probably
the section itself, was grounded somehow in the concept of privacy and
the history of the force rationale was ignored.
204 357 U.S. at 315.
205273 U.S. 95 (1927).
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V. POST-MILLER DECISIONS 20 8
A. Federal Cases
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Miller, the federal courts
have had a field day with unlawful entry questions. They have dis-
agreed, moreover, on some of the most fundamental aspects of the
Court's decision. Understandably, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit has shown little sensitivity to the ques-
tion of the source of the standard set forth in Miller as governing
entry to make arrests. Usually, Miller has been referred to without
further comment.20 ' The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Frier-
son20 upheld a forcible entry without mention of state law, citing
only Miller but distinguishing its facts. The Second Circuit upheld an
arrest perfected by a forcible entry in United States v. Nicholas 209
considering the application of section 3109, yet referring also to the
Supreme Court's Ker decision. Interestingly enough, the Ninth Cir-
cuit has apparently handed down inconsistent decisions. In Hopper
v. United States210 and Williams v. United States,2 ' Washington and
California law were held respectively to govern the manner of entry
in making an arrest. Both decisions explicitly referred to Miller as
District of Columbia law. However, in Munoz v. United States, 212
the court squarely held an arrest by federal agents without a warrant
unlawful under section 3109 as interpreted by Miller. The Sixth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Sharpe 21 1 recognized the problem, but resolved
it by finding that the entry before them was lawful by any standard.
The various District Courts which have had to consider entry
questions have also indicated some confusion. Judge Watkins in
United States v. Lawrenson214 applied Miller to an arrest which oc-
206 No comment will be made here on United States v. Barrow, 212 F. Supp. 837
(E.D. Pa. 1962). As an attorney of record for the United States, in this case, an
out of court comment by me would be of questionable propriety under Rule 20 of
the Canon of Ethics. Suffice it to say that Judge Joseph Lord's opinion should be
consulted by anyone interested in the development of the law in this area.
207 See, e.g., Hair v. United States, 289 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1961) ; Williams v.
United States, 276 F.2d 522 (D.C. Cir. 1960), reversing United States v. Murphy,
174 F. Supp. 823 (D.D.C. 1959). But see Wayne v. United States, No. 16709, D.C.
Cir., April, 1963, p. 12.
208 299 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1962).
209 319 F2d 697 (2d Cir. 1963).
210 267 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1959).
211 273 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1959).
2 1 2 No. 18,488, 9th Cir., Nov. 29, 1963. See also Leahy v. United States, 272
F.2d 487 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 363 U.S. 810 (1960), dismnissed by stipulation,
364 U.S. 945 (1961).
213 No. 15129, 6th Cir., August 30, 1963, p. 5.
214 No. -, D. Md., April 13, 1960 (unreported).
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curred in Maryland. Judge Roth in United States v. Wakefield 215
followed the suggestion of an Assistant United States Attorney and
held that under Miller section 3109 governed an arrest which occurred
in Michigan. Only one District Court has explicitly recognized the
real character of Miller. In United States v. Macri, 16 Judge Smith,
relying on United States v. Di Re 217 and Miller itself, held that Con-
necticut law governed an arrest which occurred in that state.
What constitutes "breaking" within the rule, whatever its source,
has also been the subject of some disagreement. Although both
Williams and Hopper were decisions applying state law, each referred
to Miller as a case dealing with forcible entry. The court in Williams
was therefore able to uphold an entry through a shut but unlocked
door and in Hopper to uphold an entry through an open door. In
United States v. Silverman,2 1 Judge Holtzoff agreed with the Ninth
Circuit and referred to Miller as a case limited to forcible entry. On
the other hand, Judge Bazelon, in Hair v. United States,19 following
a privacy rather than a force approach, remarked that it made no dif-
ference if the door "was locked, closed but unlocked, or merely left
ajar." 220 Apparently he would view any entry without proper an-
nouncement as illegal. Judge Smith in Macri observed that the use
of force was not "a significant factor in the Miller case." 221 Judge
Watkins in Lawrenson held that an entry obtained by getting a hotel
employee to unlock a door was a "breaking," and Judge Roth in
Wakefield felt that when a door opened from the mere force of knock-
ing a "breaking" had occurred.
Entry obtained by misrepresentation of identity without force, on
the other hand, was upheld in Leahy v. United States.222 It is not en-
tirely clear, however, whether Judge Orr's position was that the entry
was not a "breaking" and therefore not within the rule, or whether he
merely considered it a justifiable exception to the general rule. After
observing that misrepresentation of identity is not a breaking, he
went on to justify the use of the strategem. Such justification would
not, of course, have been necessary unless some exception to a general
rule was involved.
215 No. -, E.D. Mich., July 2, 1962 (unreported).
216 185 F. Supp. 144 (D. Conn. 1960), cf. 36 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 432 (1961).
217 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
218 166 F. Supp. 838, 841 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 275 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1960),
rev'd on other grounds, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
219 289 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
2 2 0 Id. at 897.
221 185 F. Supp. 144, 149 (D. Conn. 1960).
22 272 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1959). See note 212 supra.
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The existence or absence of exceptions to the rule has itself been
the subject of comment. Judge Swygert in Frierson used Miller as
authority to uphold a forcible entry when no announcement of purpose
had been made on the ground that there was a "virtual certainty" that
purpose was known. In Nicholas, the Second Circuit likewise found
that any announcement in similar circumstances would have been a
"useless gesture." The Sixth Circuit in Sharpe also upheld a forcible
entry after only an announcement of identity when it was immediately
followed by an indication that evidence subject to seizure was in peril
of destruction. Yet these opinions must be compared with Williams
v. United States,223 which reversed United States v. Murphy.224 A
finding of "virtual certainty" is apparently a difficult task for some
judges. Judge Bazelon in Hair, moreover, even observed that it
"may be doubted whether Miller is susceptible to such an exception." 225
Judge Watkins in Lawrenson also failed to find an exception
despite the fact that the FBI agents were arresting an armed bank
robber. He observed:
It is probably a matter of no moment, but I disagree violently
. but I am bound by the [Miller] decision unless or until
it is changed . . . . I must, therefore, find that because
the FBI agents before they had the door unlocked did not
first announce their presence and purpose, and then, but only
then, if entrance were not granted, and if they were still alive,
either unlock or break down the door, the entry, arrest and
seizure were accordingly, illegal.228
Judge Smith in Macri also refused to find under Connecticut law an
exception warranting no announcement when evidence might be de-
stroyed although evidence had been previously destroyed by the same
individual in a similar situation.
A number of cases since Miller have dealt with forcible entries
under section 3109. Masiello v. United States 227 makes it clear that
the statute requires an announcement of both identity and purpose in
the execution of a search warrant. "Breaking" was construed in
Keiningham v. United States in these terms : 228
[T]he word "break," as used in 18 U.S.C. § 3109, means
"enter without permission." We think that a "peaceful"
223 276 F.2d 522 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
224 174 F. Supp. 823 (D.D.C. 1959).
225289 F.2d 894, 896 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
226 No. -, D. Md., April 13, 1960 (unreported). (Emphasis added.)
227304 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1962), aff'd on appeal following remand, 317 F.2d
121 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
228287 F.2d 126, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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entry which does not violate the provisions of § 3109 must
be a permissive one, and not merely one which does not re-
sult in a breaking of parts of the house.
Here again the key is clearly more than the absence of force. The
requirement of announcement under section 3109 also has been lim-
ited to the initial breaking.229
On the question of "refused admittance," Judge Burger aptly
observed in the second Masiello v. United States "0 that
the phrase . . . is not restricted to an affirmative refusal.
Indeed it would be an unusual case coming before the courts
where an occupant affirmatively "refused admittance" or
otherwise made his refusal known verbally after being given
notice ....
Silence then may be construed to constitute a "refused admittance"
after a reasonable period of time."3 The cases have not, however,
established a precise time interval. In Masiello I, Judge Burger
termed the question a matter of the facts and circumstances of each
case.3 2  Forcible entry, moreover, has been sustained when "admit-
tance was not forthcoming;" 233 after "twenty-five or thirty seconds"
no response was heard; 234 after "about a minute;" 235 and after "a
minute or two." 236
No response plus meaningful noise or its cessation may also indi-
cate refusal. Forcible entry has been sustained when noise heard
after announcement was thought to "indicate refusal;" " when the
229 United States v. Nicholas, No. 366, 2d Cir., June 26, 1963.
230 317 F2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
231 United States v. Viale, 312 F.2d 595 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 903(1963); United States v. Whiting, 311 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 935 (1963) ; Sykes v. United States, 312 F.2d 232 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 942 (1963).
232 304 F.2d 399, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (concurring opinion). "It should be clear
that . . . [the necessary] time lapse [that should occur] between the police announce-
ment and a break-in cannot be rigidly defined . . . ." In Masiello v. United States,
317 F.2d 121, 123 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1963), Judge Burger suggests that it is not "too
much to expect that officers . . . take some note of the time." When there is a
conflict of testimony, the finding of the hearing judge will be respected if it is
supported by substantial evidence, Sykes v. United States, 312 F.2d 232 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 273 U.S. 942 (1963), or if a fair resolution of the issue of credibility
is made, Masiello v. United States, supra.
233 United States v. Purgitt, 176 F. Supp. 557 (D.D.C. 1959).
234United States v. Gorman, 208 F. Supp. 747, 750 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
235United States v. Whiting, 311 F.2d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 935 (1963).
2360United States v. Viale, 312 F.2d 595, 602 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
942 (1963).
237United States v. Fair, 176 F. Supp. 571, 572-73 (D.D.C. 1959).
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sound heard prior to announcement stopped;s s and when the sound
heard after the announcement indicated that the occupants were at-
tempting to destroy evidence." 9 Relevant in this last situation may be
the officers' experience with like attempts in similar cases in the past.
Again in Masiello II,' 4° Judge Burger noted:
Officers of experience with the numbers racket were .
warranted in believing that the "commotion" which was
heard through the door, accompanied by no response follow-
ing two knocks and one announcement of authority and pur-
pose, meant that the occupants were very likely engaged in
what might be called "standard emergency procedure" of
destroying the evidence.
Significantly, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has also construed section 3109 in Jones v. United States"4' to permit
the use of trick or subterfuge to get the occupant to open the door.2'
The decision closely parallels Leahy which, of course, dealt with the
arrest situation. It should be noted, however, that the decision was
five-to-four, and the dissent raised Gouled v. United States "3 as a
possible constitutional barrier to the majority opinion.244
B. State Cases
Since Miller, forcible entry questions have been considered in a
number of states with California leading the list. Under Maddox, how-
ever, the California courts have uniformly refused to grant suppression
=
8 Sykes v. United States, 312 F.2d 232, 234 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
942 (1963).
239 Masiello v. United States, 317 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
24 0 Id. at 123.
241304 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 852 (1963).
= It must be added that the Jones case is, at least arguably, open to the inter-
pretation that no trick was used. The "trick" consisted in not telling the occupant
that the janitor he asked for was also accompanied by the police.
243 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
244 Unanswered to date is the scope of the term "house" under 18 U.S.C. § 3109
(1958). The provision was based on the New York law. There, Haggerty v. Wilber,
16 Johns. R. 287 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819), which upheld an entry into a nondwelling
without announcement, is the leading case. Haggerty, moreover, followed Penton v.
Brown, 1 Keble 698, 83 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1669), which in turn was purportedly
based on Seinayne's Case. As a matter of legislative history, therefore, it would
seem that "house" within § 3109 is limited to a family type dwelling. See also the
opinion of Lord Mansfield in Lee v. Gansel, 1 Cowp. 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 935, 937-38
(K.B. 1774). The key question, however, is whether the concept of reasonableness
in the first clause of the fourth amendment, which now embodies, as we shall later
see, the rule of announcement, can be squared with this historical development. The
teaching of Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), which upheld a similar
congressional distinction between an automobile and a dwelling house under the
warrant clause, is that the distinction can be sustained.
See also Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (apparent
agreement that civil emergency may warrant forcible entry independent of § 3109).
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motions on unlawful entry pleas.245 Miller itself was largely ignored
in California for the better part of four years. Judge Ford's opinion
in People v. Gauthier 4 is the first reported California case even to
cite Miller. The entry in the case was upheld, however, and Miller
was referred to as having been decided "from the standpoint of statu-
tory rather than constitutional law." 247 Nothing in Mapp v. Ohio 248
was deemed to require a different result. The Texas Court of Crim-
inal Appeals also reconsidered its rule in light of Miller. In McCown
v. State, 2 49 the court decided to adhere to its long-standing practice
and refused to suppress evidence for nonliteral compliance with Texas'
announcement rule. The Tennessee Supreme Court has also decided
a post-Miller forcible entry question. In White v. State,250 it affirmed
its former practice without even citing Miller.
Miller has not, however, been completely ignored by the states.
In State v. Vuin,25' an Ohio court of common pleas rendered an alter-
native holding, based largely on Miller, that a violation of Ohio's
forcible entry statute 252 warrants the suppression of subsequently ob-
tained evidence. Miller was also felt in New York.2 Judge Geller in
People v. Cocchiara 254 discussed the application of section 178 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires announcement prior to
forcible entry to arrest, when such an entry was made by deception.
While not actually deciding the matter, he apparently did not feel that
Miller controlled his decision and indicated that the California rule
245 People v. Bookout, 197 Cal. App. 2d 457, 17 Cal. Rptr. 213 (Dist. Ct. App.
1961) (narcotic arrest); People v. Baca, 197 Cal. App. 2d 362, 17 Cal. Rptr. 204
(Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (burglary arrest) ; People v. Ruiz, 196 Cal. App. 2d 695, 16
Cal. Rptr. 855 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (narcotic arrest); People v. Ker, 195 Cal. App.
2d 246, 15 Cal. Rptr. 767 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961), aff'd mib nor. Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1963) (narcotic arrest) ; People v. Garcia, 187 Cal. App. 2d 93, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 493 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (narcotic arrest) ; People v. Fisher, 184 Cal. App. 2d
308, 7 Cal. Rptr. 461 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (narcotic arrest); People v. Montano,
184 Cal. App. 2d 199, 7 Cal. Rptr. 307 (Dist Ct. App. 1960) (narcotic arrest);
People v. Feeley, 179 Cal. App. 2d 100, 3 Cal. Rptr. 529 (Dist Ct. App. 1960)
(narcotic arrest) ; People v. Covan, 178 Cal. App. 2d 416, 2 Cal. Rptr. 811 (Dist.
Ct App. 1960) (narcotic arrest) ; People v. Williams, 175 Cal. App. 2d 774, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 44 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (narcotic arrest) ; People v. Castro, 176 Cal. App. 2d
325, 1 Cal. Rptr. 231 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (narcotic arrest).
246205 Cal. App. 2d 419, 22 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Dist Ct. App. 1962) (narcotic
arrest).
2 4 Id. at 425, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
248367 U.S. 643 (1961).
241 170 Tex. Crim. 142, 338 S.W.2d 732 (1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 856 (1961)
(entry after no response to knocking lawful) ; see Texas cases cited note 84 supra.
250 356 S.W2d 411 (Tenn. 1962) (burglary arrest announcement by police made
forcible entry lawful).
25189 Ohio L. Abs. 600, 185 N.E.2d 506 (C.P. 1962).
= OHIo REv. CoDE ANN. § 2935.12 (Page 1954).
253 Here it is interesting to recall that the federal rule is supposed to reflect
New York law. See note 98 supra.
2 31 Misc. 2d 495, 221 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. County Ct. 1961).
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should be followed. It is not clear from Judge Geller's opinion, how-
ever, whether he considered the entry by trick to be an exception, or
simply not covered because no "breaking" was involved. In People v.
Goldfarb,255 however, section 178, on the authority of Miller, was
"strictly construed" to require the suppression of gambling parapher-
nalia seized after police broke into an apartment having only demanded,
"Open up." On the other hand, Judge Sobel in People v. Montanaro 256
commented on the "breaking in" sections of the code in these terms:
[I]t should be noted that the Miller decision is not of consti-
tutional dimension. It interpreted a Federal Statute not the
Fourth Amendment. Most States . . . have excused com-
pliance with "breaking in" statutes under "exigent circum-
stances" . . .. It is suggested . . . when a search war-
rant is directed against easily disposable contraband the
police officers need only make a conscientious effort to enter
peaceably and if there is no response to the knock or oral
request for admission [they] may use force.
• . [E]xigent circumstances exist when the property
sought is easily disposable and there is danger in requir-
ing strict compliance with the "breaking in" requirements of
the Code.257
It must be noted, of course, that neither Cocchiara, Goldfarb, nor
Montanaro is an opinion of the New York Court of Appeals. What
that court will have to say about the forcible entry rule and its under-
lying policy remains to be seen.258
In State v. Smith,59 the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the
validity of a narcotics conviction when a warrantless arrest had been
effected by a forcible entry without an announcement. The court
found that the offense was committed in the officers' presence and that
they had probable cause to make the arrest. New Jersey has no forci-
ble entry statute and no New Jersey case had previously considered
a question of proper announcement, but the court assumed "for pres-
ent purposes" that Mapp made Miller applicable to the states. Chief
Justice Weintraub, writing for the court, then stated:
We must identify precisely what is involved. We are not
dealing with the sufficiency of the basis for a search. Prob-
25534 Misc. 2d 866, 229 N.Y.S.2d 620 (N.Y. County Ct. 1962).
2Z 5634 Misc. 2d 624, 229 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Kings County Ct 1962).
257 Id. at 630, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 684-85. (Emphasis added.)
258 People v. Rodriguez, 38 Misc. 2d 949, 237 N.Y.S.2d 924 (App. T. 1963),
also considered Miller in the context of a challenged entry under New York's breaking
statutes. It held both the statutes and Miller to be limited to forcible entry.
259 37 N.J. 481, 181 A.2d 761 (1962).
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able cause existed. The right to invade the privacy of the
occupant was clear.
The question then is whether the Fourth Amendment
intended to nullify the State's clear right to search by impos-
ing a condition which would defeat it. If the State's right
to the contraband is to be denied, it must be because of the
evident danger and rudeness of a sudden entry. But the dan-
ger and the rudeness are not the gratuitous product of official
insolence or indifference; they are the consequences of the
criminal enterprise, made inescapable by its nature. More-
over, in striking a balance between the right of the State and
the rights of the individual, the need to protect the innocent
is not a conspicuous factor; for, as we have said, the hypothesis
includes the existence of probable cause and indeed a reason-
able basis to believe a criminal event is in progress. Hence, to
require that admittance be demanded and the mission revealed
before entry into the premises would, overall, benefit the
guilty alone. It seems to us that the Fourth Amendment does
not transmute a "reasonable" search into an "unreasonable"
one merely because the officer discharged his duty to arrest
and search in a manner which fairly appeared necessary for
the successful enforcement of the State's right.260
Although the court saw no violation of the fourth amendment in the
forcible entry before it, the assumption that Miller was more than a
construction of a federal statute or a statement of the common law
was commendably farsighted.
C. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court decided only three cases during the post-
Miller, pre-Ker period in which a Justice had occasion to comment on
Miller. ' The most significant of the post-Miller comments occurred
in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Elkins v. United States,262
which overruled the silver platter doctrine of Weeks v. United States.26
In an opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart, the Court held that evidence
illegally seized by state officers cannot be used in the federal courts.
The scope of the majority holding is not entirely clear from the opin-
2 60 Id. at 499-500, 181 A.2d at 770-71.
261 Mr. justice Douglas, dissenting, refers to Miller in Wilson v. Schnettler, 365
U.S. 381, 395 n.9 (1960), in a context of a discussion of the fourth amendment and
the right of privacy. He merely cites it, however, as an illustration of one of those
cases which follows the rule that illegally seized evidence will be suppressed. Mr.
Justice Clark also refers to Miller in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 658 (1960), on
the point of "shortcut" police methods.
262364 U.S. 206 (1960).
263232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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ion. The test of illegality apparently was based solely on the fourth
amendment. A distinction, therefore, could be drawn between evi-
dence illegally seized under the fourth amendment and that illegally
seized under statutory or court rules. At any rate, this was Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter's view of the case. As an illustration of the distinc-
tion, he cited "the rules governing the execution of lawful warrants,
applied in Miller v. United States . . .". 264 Elkins, however, left
unsettled the question of what disposition would be made of evidence,
for example, legally secured by state officers under state announcement
standards but which would have been illegally secured under com-
parable federal standards.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter also referred to Miller in Jones v. United
States."5 In remanding the case for reconsideration of the evidence
under section 3109, he noted that Miller made clear that the application
of section 3109 was a question of all the facts and circumstances.
Unfortunately, he did not make it unequivocally clear that this was
true because Miller was a construction of section 3109 or an applica-
tion of a rule virtually identical but independent of section 3109. Fail-
ure to give this kind of attention to his language, it must be noted, is
most unusual in an opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter. It is, how-
ever, characteristic, as we shall see, of almost all of the Court's an-
nouncement cases.
In Wong Sun v. United States,26 Mr. Justice Brennan referred to
his opinion in Miller. He used Miller as an analogy to show that
flight is ambiguous when an officer seeking admission does not identify
himself and announce his purpose and, therefore, will not warrant an
inference of guilt on which a judgment of the existence of probable
cause can be made. After making the analogy to justify his finding
of ambiguity, however, Mr. Justice Brennan noted that the Govern-
ment did not claim that the officer's failure to announce his identity at
the door was warranted by a possibility of peril or the destruction of
evidence.267 How this explanation for the failure to announce would
264 364 U.S. at 244. The requirement of a written affidavit under FED. R. CRTm.
P. 41 would be another illustration. Compare Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S.
480 (1958), with Sparks v. United States, 90 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1932).
To date, however, it must be observed that the lower federal courts have appar-
ently been oblivious to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's distinction. See, e.g., United States,
v. Walters, 193 F. Supp. 788 (W.D. Ark. 1961) (rule 41(e) assumed to be the
standard) ; James v. United States, 280 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1960) (18 U.S.C. § 3052
(1958) assumed to be the standard). Yet because of the change in law worked by
Elkins and, as we shall see, by Mapp-Ker, we can expect that a number of federal
problems will receive incidental clarification. The Supreme Court, for example, has
never decided what "positive" in nighttime search warrants means under Fmn. R.
C im. P. 41(c).
265 362 U.S. 257, 272 (1960).
266 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
267 Id. at 484.
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effect the fundamental ambiguity of the accused's reaction is not spelled
out. Mr. Justice Brennan did not explicitly hold, moreover, that the
entry was unlawful because a proper announcement was not made, and,
since the arrest occurred in California, it is not clear how Miller could
control this issue.268 The best that can be said for this further remark
is that it is itself ambiguous. It does, on the other hand, constitute a
reference to possible justifications for a failure to announce purpose
and identity. To this limited degree, the aside is significant.
Mr. Justice Clark also referred to Miller in his dissenting opinion
in Wong Sun, in which Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White joined.
Mr. Justice Clark felt that the defendant's flight presented no am-
biguity, that there was no basis in Miller for concluding that the
accused's retreat from the door was an attempt to repel an unauthor-
ized intrusion,26 and that the officer had clearly identified himself. Two
other remarks by Mr. Justice Clark in his discussion of Miller have
significance beyond the narrow question of the ambiguity of flight. At
one point he asked, after noting that the officer had identified himself
as a narcotics agent, how "could he more clearly announce himself and
his purpose?" 270 Thus, the dissent would apparently be willing to
find that purpose may be inferred from a statement of identity. It is
difficult to understand how this squares with Miller. Mr. Justice Clark
also referred to Miller at another point as a case which "involved inter-
pretation of the law of the District of Columbia." 271 It appears then
that the various members of the Court have not finally settled in their
own minds the full meaning of Miller.72
VI. KER V. CALIFORNIA
A. The Facts
Having probable cause to arrest Ker, four Los Angeles County
police officers proceeded to his apartment and learned that it was occu-
pied. They then went to the building manager and obtained a pass key
to the apartment. One officer was stationed outside the window of the
apartment to intercept ejected evidence. The other officers quietly
268 The general question was, however, argued in the briefs. See, e.g., Brief for
Respondent, pp. 33-36.
269 371 U.S. at 502 (dissenting opinion).
27o Id. at 501.
271 Id. at 502.
2 72 
It should be noted in fairness to the Court and some of the lower court judges
that the Bar is not altogether sure what Miller means either. See, e.g., 8 WIamoRE,
EVIDENCE § 2184a (McNaughton rev. 1961); Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States:
A Study it Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483, 503-07 (1963) ; Kaplan, Search
and Seizure: A No-Mat's Land in the Criminal Law, 49 CALIF. L. PEv. 474, 501,
502 n.183 (1961).
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unlocked and opened the apartment door and found Ker sitting in the
living room. This course of action was taken, it was testified, because
of the officer's experience with attempts to destroy evidence. Ker and
his wife were arrested, and marijuana was found in the subsequent
search.
Ker and his wife were convicted of a violation of California nar-
cotics laws. 3  The California District Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction," and the Supreme Court of California denied a petition
for hearing without an opinion. The District Court of Appeals, inter
alia, found that the entry was lawful under the rationale of Maddox
and held that "to have announced themselves and/or delayed entry, the
officers would have provided Ker sufficient time within which to dis-
pose of or destroy the narcotics." 275 The Supreme Court subsequently
granted certiorari.27
B. Argument of Counsel for Ker
Ker's argument on certiorari need not detain us long. Apart
from the question of the standard governing the search and seizure,"'
he relied primarily on the proposition that a warrantless search had
occurred.2 78  For the proposition that such a search is invalid, he cited
the standard cases, McDonald v. United States2 7 and Johnson v.
United States.2 0 The counter-contention that the search might be
sustained as incident to the arrest was met by arguing that the officers
intended to search rather than arrest.28" Here Ker relied on Johnson 282
and on Lefkowitz v. United States.2
The possible application of Miller itself, or a rule of announce-
ment, whatever its source, was ignored. Wisely perhaps, the Califor-
nia cases on announcement were not mentioned.
C. Argument of the American Civil Liberties Union of
Southern California as Amicus Curiae
The crux of the short Amicus brief, like that of Ker's was that
the entry had been made to search for evidence, although the ACLU
2 7 3 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11530.
274 People v. Ker, 195 Cal. App. 2d 246, 15 Cal. Rptr. 767 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962),
aff'd meb nor. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
275 Id. at 256, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 772-73.
276368 U.S. 974 (1962).
277 Brief for Petitioner, pp. 4-5.
278 Id. at 5-7.
279 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
280 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
281 Brief for Petitioner, pp. 11, 13.
282 333 U.S. at 13-14.
283 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932).
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added that the search might have been for the existence of crime."8
The ACLU did, however, address itself to what the Court subsequently
considered the core of the matter. It argued that when lawful pro-
cedures are available then such clandestine procedures as here descend
to the "unreasonable search and seizure prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment." 285 This proposition was based, strangely enough, not
on Miller, or as part of an otherwise full scale assault on the California
announcement cases, but on Gouled v. United States2 . and Johnson
v. United States.28 7
Noting that the officers may have been motivated by their knowl-
edge that narcotics are "often disposed easily by flushing down the
drains," it was still suggested "that this is preferable to fostering the
cancer of this surreptitious, clandestine, stealthy, furtive entry, without
a warrant, into a man's home." 288 Again, however, the main thrust
of the argument was directed at the right to enter and not the manner
of entry, and once it was assumed the entry was to search, however
effected, such cases as Agnello v. United States 28 9 and Taylor v. United
States "9 o were relied upon for the proposition that probable cause
alone would not sustain the search.
D. Argument of the People of California
The Attorney General of California divided his brief into two
main parts. His argument on the issue of the proper substantive
standard to apply under Mapp, although persuasive, need not detain
us. The Attorney General sought to justify the search and seizure on
California and federal cases, where they agreed, and where they dis-
agreed, on the reasonableness of the California view. 9'
After making the obvious point that probable cause to arrest with-
out a warrant existed,2 92 he moved on to deal with the manner of the
entry in terms of the California rule under section 844 and People v.
MaddoX.2 93  The heart of this argument was that the California rule
which permitted unannounced entry when there was reasonable belief
284 Brief for the ACLU as Amicus Curiae, p. 4.
285 Id. at &
286255 U.S. 298 (1921).
287333 U.S. 10 (1948).
288 Brief for the ACLU as Amicus Curiae, p. 10. It seems appropriate to com-
ment that at this point the Amicus was apparently arguing more by sound and
adjective than analysis and reason.
289269 U.S. 20 (1925).
290 286 U.S. 1 (1932).
291Brief for Respondent, p. 17.
292 Id. at 17-21.
-93 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858 (1956).
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that evidence might be destroyed was reasonable in light of the danger
narcotics presented to the "total demolition of the personality" 294 and
the peculiarly vexatious problem California has had as a seacoast state
with the narcotics traffic.295 The general experience of the officers
with attempts to destroy such contraband and the various precautions
taken prior to the actual arrest were cited for the existence of the pos-
sibility and the good faith of the officers.29 Thereafter, the brief pre-




Like Mapp, Ker is a graphic illustration of the inability of the
Justices to agree in search and seizure cases. The opinion is divided
into five parts. Part I deals with the nature of the proper standard
applicable under the fourth-fourteenth amendments against the states,
an issue left undecided in Mapp. It has the concurrence of all of the
Justices save Mr. Justice Harlan. Our attention will be focused on it
only to the degree that it is relevant to federal law enforcement when
it distinguishes between constitutional and supervisory power to sup-
press. Part II deals with the question of probable cause, Part III
with the method of entry, Part IV with search incident to an arrest,
and Part V with an issue not raised by the briefs or considered by the
Court. Parts II-V represent the opinion of Justices Clark, Black,
Stewart, and White. Mr. Justice Harlan concurred only in result.
Justices Brennan, Douglas, Goldberg, and the Chief Justice dissented
in a three part opinion. Like the dissent, our primary concern here
will be with the issues presented in Part III above.
Mr. Justice Clark began his four-man opinion by referring to the
holding of Mapp and noting the irony that the initial test under it
came from California, a state which had been commended for having
already voluntarily adopted the exclusionary rule. He then carefully
pointed out what Mapp did not involve. He recognized the distinc-
tion between the operation of the exclusionary rule when it is founded
on the Constitution itself rather than the supervisory power of the
Court. In the latter category he placed McNabb, Miller itself, and
Nardone. He alluded to the problems of a "healthy federalism" and
the "practical demands of effective law enforcement" while comment-
ing that, although the "same fundamental criteria" had to govern both
294 Brief for Respondent at 25.
95 Id. at 14.
298Id. at 24.
297 Id. at 25-35.
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state and federal law enforcement activity, there was no "fixed for-
mula" for the test of constitutional reasonableness.298  Each case would
have to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. Alluding again
to the supervisory-constitutional distinction, he concluded that the
states were free to develop "workable rules" governing arrests and
searches and seizure; this would be subject only to the same under-
lying limitations of the fourth-fourteenth amendment. 2 9  Hence a
fundamental uniformity was recognized subject only to reasonable
variations growing out of "investigative and enforcement tech-
niques." 100 He then proceeded to apply this underlying federal stand-
ard to the California practice illustrated by the facts before him.
Having affirmed the finding of probable cause in Part II, Mr.
Justice Clark moved in Part III to a discussion of the method of entry.
He began by noting that the lawfulness of arrests for a federal offense
was a question of state law subject only to the Constitution. Here he
cited Miller, Di Re, and Johnson. For Mr. Justice Clark, a fortiori the
lawfulness of an arrest by state officers for state offenses was to be de-
termined by California law, specifically section 844 and the judicial
gloss of Maddox. Under the holding of Part I, the California rule had
only to meet the fundamental criteria of reasonableness imposed by the
Constitution to pass muster. He held that it did.
Assuming that entry by key was the legal equivalent of "break-
ing," "' he recognized the reasonableness and lawful character of such
a breaking in certain circumstances. After noting this, he began a
series of contrasts between Miller, section 3109, and the California
rule, arguing by way of analogy. He referred to Miller as having been
decided as a question of "the law of the District of Columbia," which
was, he said, by a court-accepted concession in Miller, "substantially
identical" to the general federal rule for search warrants under sec-
tion 3109. He then noted that no exigent circumstance exception had
been argued or discussed at length in Miller, and the Court had merely
cited the Maddox decision "without disapproval." 302 By contrast,
under Maddox, the California rule "clearly" included "an exception to
the notice requirement" under "exigent circumstances." 803
During this preliminary discussion, prior to his actual holding,
Mr. Justice Clark made some obiter observations pregnant for the
.298 374 U.S. at 32.
2991d. at 34.
300 Ibid.
301 Here he referred to Keiningham v. United States, 287 F.2d 126, 130 (D.C.
Cir. 1960).
302 374 U.S. at 40.
303 Id. at 39.
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administration of federal criminal law. Although Mr. Justice Clark
had previously described Miller as District of Columbia law, making a
further contrast between Miller, section 3109, and the California rule,
he observed that Miller was "inapposite for state prosecutions, where
admissibility is governed by constitutional standards" "insofar as [it
involved a] violation of a federal statute .... ," " To the degree
that Mr. Justice Clark was echoing his earlier-mentioned distinction
between supervisory power and constitutional suppression, what he
said here is clear enough. Yet by referring to Miller as involving the
exclusion of evidence under the aegis of a "federal statute," he con-
tradicted his prior observation that Miller was District of Columbia
law. The difference is crucial when federal arrests occur outside the
District of Columbia. Are federal arrests in California when an entry
without announcement occurs, for example, to be governed by section
844 with the gloss of Maddox, or section 3109 with the gloss of Miller?
It is hardly necessary to point out that Maddox and Miller evinced an
almost absolute polarity in judicial attitudes toward the question of
proper announcement.
As if the confusion on this point was not already hopeless, Mr.
Justice Clark proceeded in a footnote"' to add to what he himself had
termed a "Chinese puzzle." He observed that in Wong Sun v. United
States306 "the Court held that Federal Officers had not complied with
§ 3109 in executing an arrest." 307 This is what he had accused the
majority of doing in his dissent in Wong Sun30 ° The majority opin-
ion, moreover, is susceptible to this construction. Yet it is hard to see
how a federal statute dealing with search warrants can apply to an
arrest without a warrant made in California. Since Justices Harlan,
Stewart, and White concurred in the Wong Sun dissent and Mr. Jus-
tice Black concurs in this Ker observation on Wong Sun, does it mean
that there is now a five man majority for the proposition that section
3109 controls the manner of entry in federal arrests? Is it ever profit-
able to speculate on points such as this? It is enough, perhaps, to refer
to them merely to illustrate the confused state of the law.
Coming back to the analysis of Mr. Justice Clark's argument, he
proceeded, following the Miller and section 3109 allusions, to finding
"uniquely present" the "justification for the officers' failure to give
3 Ibid.
305 Id. at 40 n.11.
306 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
307 374 U.S. at 40 n.11.
308 See text accompanying note 269 supra. On the "clarifying" function of dis-
sents see JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
18-19 (1955).
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notice." 309 He found the destruction of evidence rationale of Maddox
reasonable and then isolated two factors which made it applicable: the
officers knew Ker was in possession of narcotics which could be easily
and quickly destroyed, and Ker's furtive conduct in eluding them
shortly before the arrest warranted them in thinking he might be
expecting the police. 1 ' These two factors taken with the officers'
past experience with attempts to destroy evidence justified the un-
announced entry which Mr. Justice Clark and his brethren felt was not
unreasonable under "the standards of the Fourth Amendment as ap-
plied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment." "1-
As was noted above, Mr. Justice Harlan concurred only in the
result. He expressed his opinion that the abandonment of the more
"flexible concept" of due process was "uncalled for and unwise." 312
It was uncalled for because the states had been showing increasing
"concern" with improving their own criminal procedures and unwise
because of the "differing" problem faced on the state level and the
"atmosphere of uncertainty" which would be created in view of the
lack of "predictability" of the "Court's decisions in the realm of search
and seizure." 313 He disapproved, in short, of the whole "constitu-
tional adventure." '14
Mr. Justice Brennan began his dissent by setting out the three
circumstances which would, in his opinion, justify an unannounced
entry. For him, and his codissenters, all other unannounced entries,
with or without a warrant, would violate the fourth amendment.
The first exception arises out of the situation "where the persons
within already know of the officers' authority and purpose." 15 Here
it is appropriate to ask if "already know" differs from the "virtual
certainty" standard set out in Miller. Does the exception depend on
the objective fact or the situation as it appeared to the officers tested
by the "virtual certainty" rule? Mr. Justice Brennan does not en-
lighten us on this point.
The second exception deals with the situation where "the officers
are justified in the belief that persons within are in imminent peril of
309 374 U.S. at 40.
310 During the investigation which preceded the arrest, the officers had observed
one Murphy and Ker apparently engaged in a sale of narcotics. Later, while following
Ker's car, the officers lost Ker when he made a U-turn in the middle of the road and
drove in the opposite direction. It was following this occurrence that the officers
went to Ker's apartment to make the arrest. Id. at 27.
311 Id. at 41.
312 Id. at 45 (concurring opinion).
313 Ibid.
314 Id. at 46.
315 Id. at 47 (dissenting opinion).
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bodily harm." 816 Would Mr. Justice Brennan seriously limit the
bodily peril exception to danger to persons within? What of the po-
tential danger to the officers themselves? This is usually thought suf-
ficient. 17 Later on, he expresses concern with possible danger to
officers, citing Mr. Justice Jackson's language in McDonald about the
"fearful householder" shooting down by mistake an entering officer81S
Of course, Mr. Justice Brennan does not say "only within," but the
use of "persons within" is a change in the formula he employed in
Miller. There he said "they or someone within." 819 At any rate, the
language is unfortunately ambiguous.
The third exception deals with the situation where the people
within engage "in activity which justified the officers in the belief that
an escape or the destruction of evidence is being attempted" after they
are "made aware of the presence of someone outside." 820 Mr. Justice
Brennan, however, cuts the heart out of this exception later in his
dissent. Here he speaks of exceptions to the rule of announcement.
Later he observes that "in the absence of a showing of awareness by
the occupants of the officers' presence and purpose, 'loud noises' or
'running' within would amount, ordinarily, at least, only to ambiguous
conduct. [This could not] . . . form the basis for a belief .
that . . . the destruction of evidence is being attempted." 821 Hence
it would appear that an announcement, or a substitute which would
fit under the first noted exception, is a prerequisite to the application
of this exception. Is it then really an exception?
Having summarized by way of introduction his whole dissent, Mr.
Justice Brennan then began a three-part detailed analysis of his posi-
tion, accompanied by the review of numerous English and early Amer-
ican cases. The parts may be roughly divided into the statement of the
rule; the existence of exceptions; and the application of a possible
exception to the case before him.
His first citation in establishing the existence of the rule was the
broad dictum from Semayne's Case. He also added references to such
early text writers as Hale, Hawkins, and Foster. He does not mention
such interesting facts about the earlier commentators as Foster's
statement that the castle rule, when applied to arrest on legal process,
316 Ibid.
317 Compare Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822), with People v. Potter, 144 Cal.
App. 2d 258 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
318 374 U.S. at 58 n.12 (dissenting opinion), quoting 335 U.S. 451, 460-61 (1948)
(concurring opinion).
819 357 U.S. at 309.
320 374 U.S. at 47 (dissenting opinion).
321 Id. at 57.
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"hath been carried as far as the true principle of political justice will
warrant; perhaps beyond what is the scale of sound reason and good
policies they will warrant." 322 He also fails to point out that they
disagreed about the application of the rule in certain circumstances and
that they relied in formulating the rule primarily on the untested dictum
of Senmayne's Case-a noncriminal case.
Next he cites Curtis' Case " as an "emphatic confirmation" just
"35 years before the ratification of the Bill of Rights" 24 of the broad
rule he is advocating. The fact of the matter is that Curtis' Case cuts
against his position as much as it supports him. An announcement had
been made, so the issue of exceptions was not before the court and the
court had found sufficient to negate a defense to murder a nontechnical
form of announcement. As such, they were not dealing with the naked
right of the officer to enter, but the right of the householder to defend
himself. This is not the place for an extended discussion of the ques-
tion, but conceivably different forms of announcement, or the lack
thereof, might warrant different results, depending on the context in
which the right in question is asserted. Civil damages, defense to
homicide, and the validity of the execution of civil or criminal process,
all involve varying considerations. For this reason, it really is not
cricket to cite such cases as "emphatic confirmations" of anything ex-
cept their narrow holdings.
The difficulty in relying on inapposite cases is also brought out by
Mr. Justice Brennan's use of Launock v. Brown.3 28 He quotes from
Chief Judge Abbott's opinion, but leaves out the Judge's language
which indicates the application of the announcement rule was, as late
as 1819, unsettled judicially in felony criminal cases. He could have
avoided quoting the Chief Judge out of context if he had only cited
Mr. Justice Bayley's comments. 27
Mr. Justice Brennan then makes the patently unsupportable state-
ment that the actually unsettled and untested rule of announcement,
which he terms "firmly established," was "undoubtedly included" in
"the individual freedom carried into the Fourth Amendment." 828 He
indicates further that "both the federal and state courts have recog-
nized . . . that the requirement is of the essence of the substantive
3 22 FOSTER, CROWN LAW 319-20 (3d ed. 1792).
=2 Fost. 135, 168 Eng. Rep. 67 (KB. 1756).
24374 U.S. at 48 (dissenting opinion).
325 See, e.g., Kelly v. State, 80 Tex. Crim. 257, 190 S.W. 169 (1916) ; State v.
Williams, 49 Utah 320, 163 Pac. 1104 (1917).
26 2 Barn. & Ald. 592, 106 Eng. Rep. 482 (K.B. 1819).
327 See note 35 supra.
328 374 U.S. at 49 (dissenting opinion).
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protections which safeguard individual liberty." 329 Here he cites the
"no division of opinion" language from Accarino 3 " and a long quote
from the Massachusetts case of Barnard v. Bartlett."-' He does not
mention that the Massachusetts Supreme Court had, in Commonwealth
v. Reynolds,332 also recognized that most of the law on announcement
had been framed, not in terms of the right to enter under certain cir-
cumstances without announcement, but in terms of the unquestioned
right to enter in every case in which an announcement had taken
place. The criticism of Accarino need not be repeated here.3 3  Like-
wise he fails to comment on the observations of the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky on the right not to announce when he cites Hawkins v.
Commonwealth 3 3 4 and McCaslin v. McCord33 5 as examples of "fron-
tier states" enforcing the rule." 6 The quoted statement from McCord
is pure dictum. He further fails to note the many federal and state
cases, collected above, which could certainly be cited against him.13 7
In the closing paragraphs of Part I, Mr. Justice Brennan gets to
the core of the question: the policy consideration which may be offered
to support the rule. He refers to the early colonial experience with
writs of assistance. He frankly notes that "the problem of entry under
a general warrant . . [is] not . . . exactly that of unannounced
intrusion" yet he observes that "the two practices clearly" invite "com-
mon abuses." 338 For Mr. Justice Brennan, "similar, if not the same,
dangers to individual liberty are involved." '9 He notes general war-
rants required "some form of notice," and the writs could only be
served "during daylight hours." 340 Then he cites Gouled v. United
States 34 for the proposition that a "lawful entry" is "the indispensable
predicate of a reasonable search" 342 and he states that he would put
"rigid restrictions upon unanounced entries." 343
3 29Ibid.
330179 F.2d 456, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
33' 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 501, 502-03 (1852).
332120 Mass. 190, 196 (1876).
333 See text accompanying note 87 supra.
33453 Ky. 395, 397 (1854).
335 116 Tenn. 690, 94 S.W. 79 (1906).
336 374 U.S. at 50 (dissenting opinion).
337 All of this, of course, is not to say that the rule does not exist, or ought not
to exist. These comments are made here merely to point out that the rule advocated
by Mr. Justice Brennan is not compelled by history.
38 374 U.S. at 51 (dissenting opinion).
339 Id. at 52.
340 Ibid.
341255 U.S. 298 (1921).
342 374 U.S. at 53 (dissenting opinion).
343 Ibid.
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It is indeed unfortunate that Mr. Justice Brennan was not more
explicit in his discussion of the policy behind the rule. He never
spelled out the "common" or "similar" abuses to which he referred.
Nor does he make clear the crucial distinction between the right to
enter and the manner of entry. Such cases as Gouled are, in fact, only
intelligible when it is pointed out that an entry without probable cause,
albeit by stealth, was made. Without the right to enter, it is imma-
terial that the entry is by stealth rather than by force, since the con-
sent given does not fairly extend to the individuals' hidden purpose of
search. Gouled, therefore, says nothing about the situation in which
the entry is by right and the only question is how it shall be effected.
His use of the phrase "unlawful entry" is, therefore, ambiguous; it can
refer to "without right" or in an "improper manner." The issues in
the general warrants and writs situations are similarly not on point.
If unannounced entry ought to be restricted in any fashion, Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan fails to tell us why.
The closing paragraph of Part I is worth noting in detail since
it comments on Miller. Mr. Justice Brennan, of all people, is prob-
ably right when he observes that the Court in Miller "drew upon [an]
analogy to a federal statute" in suppressing the evidence.'" Of course,
if it was only an analogy to, and not the statute itself, which the Court
used, then section 3109 has no application, as such, to arrests. Mr.
Justice Brennan also makes the valid point that it would have been
improper to decide Miller on a constitutional basis since a nonconsti-
tutional ground existed.
Part II is begun with a confession by Mr. Justice Brennan that
he could not find any English cases which recognized an exception to
the rule.145 For Mr. Justice Brennan, therefore, the exceptions to the
rule were of American origin and were always "rigidly and narrowly
confined." "' And, more importantly, he would limit all exceptions,
save one, to those which would meet a test of knowledge or awareness
of the officers' presence. The exceptioxi is "where the officers are jus-
tified in the belief that someone within is in immediate danger of
bodily harm." a
44 Ibid.
845 However, in Aga Kurboolie Mahomed v. The Queen, 4 Moore P.C. 239, 247,
13 Eng. Rep. 293, 296 (1843), Lord Campbell recognized, in upholding a forcible
reentry without an announcement after a prior peaceful entry to make a civil arrest,
that the "law in its wisdom only requires this ceremony [of announcement] to be
observed when it possibly may be attended with some advantage, and may render the
breaking open of the outer door unnecessary."
346 374 U.S. at 54 (dissenting opinion).
347 Id. at 55.
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Here Mr. Justice Brennan uses his own opinion in Miller as the
touchstone of his reasoning. For him, Miller rests on the simple
proposition that the law does not require the performance of a "super-
fluous act"; '8 you need not tell a person what he already knows. Two
constitutional reasons based on certain practical considerations compel
a rejection of any exception not involving this preexisting awareness:
any other rule would involve an implied rejection of the presumption
of innocence; and, absent awareness, all other circumstances which
might indicate an entry should be made are "ambiguous." 3"
Mr. Justice Brennan's use of the presumption of innocence comes
perilously close to the classic fallacy of treating the presumption as evi-
dence per se rather than merely as a statement of where the burden of
proof lies.3 50 For the Justice, a failure to knock or announce can only
rest on the "automatic assumption" that the suspect within will resist
arrest, attempt escape, or destroy evidence.351 He observed that an-
other "assumption" is also necessarily involved: that a suspect to whom
an identification of official character is made will further violate the
law. Not every suspect is in fact guilty nor will every guilty suspect
resist arrest, attempt to escape, or destroy evidence.852
This line of reasoning is logically impeccable only if the basis for
the exception is, in fact, merely an assumption. On the other hand,
if it constitutes a judgment of fact based on empirical experience, it
cannot be attacked by theory but only by a refutation of the inference
drawn, or a challenge of the experience itself. The presumption of
innocence here is relevant only to the degree that it says that the burden
of proof for justifying a course of action other than announcement
should lie on the officer. It says nothing about the quantum or char-
acter of evidence which might warrant such action. Once evidence is
introduced, moreover, the presumption ought to end, assuming the
quantum of evidence required by sound social policy is met. It is in-
structive to point out that the Constitution itself only requires a "prob-
ability" not a "certainty," prior to arrest and search, and so, therefore,
talk about the problem from the point of view of objective hindsight
is not really apposite.
Mr. Justice Brennan's second point about ambiguity, in part, begs
the question. Since the actual equation in an entry situation includes
348 Ibid.
349 Id. at 56-57.
350 See United States v. Nimerick, 118 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1941). See gen-
erally 9 WIGMORP, EVIDENCE § 2511, at 406-12 (3d ed. 1940). Compare Coffin v.
United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895), with Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36, 51(1897), and Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
3 1 374 U.S. at 56 (dissenting opinion).
352 Ibid.
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a probability of guilt, action which in the abstract might be ambiguous
takes on a different color, particularly so when viewed by the trained
and experienced police officer.
Mr. Justice Brennan also presents two practical hazards; some
innocent citizens will unquestionably have their homes broken into
without announcement, and announcement "serves to minimize the
hazards of the officers' dangerous calling." 83 No argument can be
presented which will even mitigate the force of Mr. Justice Brennan's
first point. It must be admitted that innocent citizens will suffer. The
question, however, is not how to eliminate the evil, but how to
balance that evil against the alternative evil. Likewise, it is cer-
tainly a praiseworthy objective to minimize the hazards of the officers'
calling. One only wishes, however, that there was a firmer basis for
the evaluation of alternatives beyond mere speculation. The case law
indicates that the officer is shot sometimes when he announces and
sometimes when he does not.,54 Since we are dealing with a situation
in which the occupant is "probably" an outlaw, and the officer is pre-
sumptively innocent, it would be desirable to have a flexible rule which,
under appropriate circumstances, would permit the officer to assess the
situation himself and make his own judgment in the first instance,
rather than have a rigid rule formulated in the law library.355 Holmes'
point about the "happy phrase" uttered "from a protected cloister" is
relevant here. 5 '
Mr. Justice Brennan ends Part II with two final observations.
He rejects the contention that the rule of announcement might "create
serious obstacles to effective law enforcement." 357 He says that the
federal officers under the Miller rule have suffered "no discernible im-
pairment of their ability to make effective arrests and obtain important
narcotics convictions." 8 He also finds unconvincing suggestions
that varying law enforcement problems may necessitate varying law
enforcement standards. On the second point, it is sufficient here that
353 374 U.S. at 58 (dissenting opinion).
354 Compare Kelly v. State, 80 Tex. Crim. 257, 190 S.W. 169 (1916) (shot
without announcement), with State v. Williams, 49 Utah 320, 163 Pac. 1104 (1917)
(shot with announcement).
35 For example, when a situation of possible peril was involved, an officer
might decide that it would be wise to announce himself yet not wait for a refusal.
The announcement would serve to dispel any possibility of mistake and the immediate
entry would give the officer the advantage of being on the offense. A rigid library
rule might, on the other hand, see the situation solely in terms of alternatives-
announcement or no announcement.
356 HoLMES, SPEECHES 73 (1934).
357 374 U.S. at 58 (dissenting opinion).
358 Id. at 59.
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reference be made to the argument of the Attorney General of
California.8
As to the first point, again one wishes statistics were available.
Mr. Justice Brennan cites none. He does not refer to the opinion of a
federal law enforcement agency or a civil liberties organization. 60
Miller is, of course, a comparatively young rule and there is consider-
able doubt as to the scope of its application. It is apparent, however,
from a few reported post-Miller cases reviewed above, that entry
questions are being raised in most narcotic and gambling cases being
prosecuted.30' It has resulted in the suppression of evidence in some
situations in which the application of the rule could only be termed
ludicrous. Still, the safest estimation of Miller is that it is too soon to
say that federal law enforcement is crippled; yet the future is not bright.
In Part III, Mr. Justice Brennan finally turned his attention to
the case at hand. He approached Mr. Justice Clark's opinion under
two headings: the rule of "fresh pursuit," and the exception founded
on the possibility of the destruction of evidence. 0 2 He noted Mr. Jus-
tice Clark's observation on Ker's furtive conduct prior to arrest and
criticized it as "mere conjecture." 863 To the degree that Mr. Justice
Clark sought to invoke the fresh pursuit rule, and it is not clear that
he did-Mr. Justice Brennan himself says "apparently seeks to in-
voke" 64-- there is much merit in this observation. There was little
evidence showing the kind of awareness that ought, as Mr. Justice
Brennan rightly thinks, to be a prerequisite to the application of the
exception. The evidence available indicated, moreover, that Ker had
lost the police, not that they were still in active pursuit.3 65 Yet Mr.
Justice Clark is surely also right when he criticizes Mr. Justice Bren-
nan for using the information that developed after the officers' entry.36
If postentry information is relevant it ought to cut both ways, and
this is a principle which Mr. Justice Brennan would be the last person
to adopt. 67
359 Brief for Respondent, pp. 12-17.
360 One would suppose that these would be the two most informed-and balanced
-groups to ask. Presumably the testimony of the criminal class itself would be
too biased.
361Where the suppression takes place on a pretrial motion and no opinion is
written, of course, that usually ends the matter. Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S.
121 (1962). It is only by chance that you will run across a relevant unreported case.
369 374 U.S. at 60-61 (dissenting opinion).
363 Ibid.
3 64 Id. at 60.
365 See note 310 supra.
366 374 U.S. at 40-41 n.12. Mr. Justice Clark notes the familiar rule illustrated
by Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948). It is the evidence prior to
entry or arrest which counts.
367 He used the rule himself in Miller, 357 U.S. at 313.
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As Mr. Justice Brennan observes, the Clark opinion "invokes
chiefly" 3' the destruction of evidence exception, and it is on this point
that the dissent makes its most telling criticisms. For the minority,
the application of the exception would depend on an interpretation
placed on "activity within the apartment." 369 The Clark opinion, on
the other hand, apparently is willing to accept, he says, the "general
experience" of the officers in narcotic cases as a sufficient showing of
possibility of evidence destruction to warrant the application of the
exception. 70  Mr. Justice Brennan correctly observes that logically
applied such an exception presents a real "hazard" that the exceptions
"will devour the rule." "' Here perhaps the only thing that can be
said for the Court's position is that it will probably not be logically
applied. Restricted to narcotics and similar cases, it does make some
sense. Yet Mr. Justice Brennan's position likewise ought not be
logically applied. Assume, for example, that reliable information, in
addition to coming up to the standard of probable cause to search, also
indicated that gambling records, properly seizable under search war-
rant, were kept on flash paper and the door to the house in question
was bolted so that the occupants would have a chance to ignite the
records prior to entry. Should the officers in executing a search war-
rant in such a situation give the occupants a chance to take "activity
within" after an announcement or a knocking prior to forcing entry?
Only a person who elevates logic over experience, it is suggested,
would say that they should.
Criticizing the Clark opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan also refers
to "general experience" as being a "subjective judgment" inadmis-
sible when the Constitution has always thought necessary an "objective
inquiry." 372 Not to quibble with words, a judgment based on general
experience can be "objective." He does make himself somewhat
clearer, however, when he later indicates that "objective" means to
him "whether circumstances exist in the particular case." 3 Still, it
would seem that there is no absolute prohibition from making judg-
ments in classes of cases based, not on the particular situation which
will be, or is being, encountered, but rather on the kind of case it will be.
A reasonable judgment based on past experience with similar cases
is just as valid a source of "probability," and that is all we are really
368 374 U.S. at 61 (dissenting opinion).
369 Ibid.
370 Id. at 63.
371 Id. at 61.
372 Id. at 63.
373 Ibid. (Emphasis deleted.)
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dealing with, as a reasonable judgment based on facts actually being
experienced at the time. The difference is that between general and
particular experience and not between objective and subjective judg-
ment. The judgment may in either case be subjective or objective. It
would certainly be novel to assert that the Constitution somehow
limits legally cognizable judgments to those based solely on particular
experience.
Mr. Justice Brennan's parting comment bids warning to federal
officers. Like Mr. Justice Clark, he too distinguishes between consti-
tutional and supervisory power suppression. Hence it may be that he
might impose an even "higher" standard on federal than on state
officers. Logically and legally, the Court has no power to impose a
supervisory sanction on the states. They would, therefore, have to
meet only the federal minimum. If a "higher" standard is to be im-
posed on state officers it would have to emanate from the states them-
selves. Federal officers are not so fortunate. Again, apparently the
future is dark for Federal officers.
F. Conclusions
Several tentative conclusions may be drawn from Ker:
(1) The decision indicates that the rule of announcement is of
constitutional dimension.
(2) The rule is, however, subject to an exception based on the
reasonable possibility that evidence may be destroyed which would
otherwise be subject to lawful seizure.
(3) The source of authority that must be consulted in the first
instance when federal arrests occur outside the District of Columbia
remains unclear.
(4) Whether an evidence-destruction exception will be recog-
nized when federal law enforcement officers are involved also remains
unclear.
VII. CO cLUSION
Overall criticism and evaluation of the development of the rule
of announcement in Miller and Ker must begin by placing the rule in
the larger context of the suppression sanction. Debate over the exclu-
sionary rule has raged intermittently for forty years. The literature
this debate has produced is, as Professor Allen notes, "more remark-
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able for its volume than its cogency." " It would be foolish to attempt
to review the whole question here. For our limited purposes one
observation should be sufficient: the exclusionary rule makes sense-
and it does make sense-only to the degree that it offers a means of
deterring unlawful police action through compelling respect for law
"by removing the incentive to disregard it." "' Loose language to the
contrary will not withstand "close analysis." "'
Yet the concept of deterrence implies an existing rule of action
clearly understood. It is simply question-begging to speak of vindicat-
ing a right which cannot be meaningfully said to have preexisted the
proceedings in which the vindication is to take place. We put up with
this sort of thing in the judicial process generally since the creation of
new rights is usually the exception and not the rule. The law, after
all, must grow; it cannot remain static. Courts legislate, it is said, but
only "interstitially." "' The development of the rule of announcement,
however, is but a conspicuous illustration of a broader problem. For
the chief difficulty with the law of arrest, search, and seizure is that
its predominant feature, despite its venerable heritage, is that of change;
it has little or no stability.378  It is ludicrous, therefore, to speak of
meaningful deterrence when there is no preexisting ascertainable stand-
ard of conduct.379 Constitutional due process otherwise generally re-
quires such a standard.380  How can our Constitution require the rules
by which we incarcerate members of our society, who supposedly
undermine its well being, to be ascertainable, yet permit the rules by
374 Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, in 1961
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 33 (Kurland ed.).
375 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
376 Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment on
People v. Cahan, 43 CALIF. L. RFv. 565, 580 (1955).
a77 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (dissenting opinion
of Holmes, J.).
a78 The Court itself has attested to the uncertainty in this area. A few of the
Justices' remarks are collected in Note, 28 U. Crr. L. REv. 664, 665 n.9 (1961).
In United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 86 (1950) (dissenting opinion of Frank-
furter, J.), for example, it is said that "changes in the Court's composition and the
contingencies in the choice of successors" have often been the key to decisions.
379 To be sure, a vague rule may in fact deter. However, when the police officer
out of caution reads the rule conservatively, the deterrence effected will be of both
permissible and impermissible conduct. On the other hand, when the officer resolves
doubts in favor of action, the vague rule will fail to deter illegal action which a
clearer rule might have eliminated. Either way, the interests of both society and
the individual, which in the long run are the same, will suffer.
The vague rule also poses an even more serious threat to the administration of
justice. The police officer who does not know how to follow the law experiences a
frustration of which the ultimate fruit benefits no one: the result will be either no
action, out of a "what's the use" attitude; corruption, out of a "I might as well get
something out of it" attitude; or illegal, extrajudicial law enforcement, out of a "if
I can't get my job done with the help of the courts, I'll get it done without them"
attitude. In the final analysis, such a rule tends to break down law enforcement and
creates a situation far worse than that which existed prior to its formulation.
380 See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
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which we discipline law enforcement officers, who supposedly promote
its well being, to be chaotic?
Once the Supreme Court had agreed to hear the Miller appeal, it
is difficult to see why the majority decided the case on such a narrow
ground as the law of the place where the arrest occurred. By holding
that the law of the District of Columbia controlled the legality of the
entry, the majority placed federal arrests by federal officers in juris-
dictions other than the District of Columbia under anything but an
ascertainable or, for that matter, uniform standard. Further, it is
unfortunate that the majority opinion only referred to the basis of the
decision in the context of what subsequent cases have indicated was an
ambiguous discussion of a federal statute of general application. The
execution of search warrants is to be governed by the federal statute.
Arrests, however, are to be governed by reference to state law, that is,
if the judge hearing the motion to suppress correctly reads the Miller
opinion. When he does not, or he is led astray by the argument of an
unschooled Assistant United States Attorney or a skilled defense at-
torney, the picture only becomes more complicated. Most states have
no clearly articulated body of precedent in the area of announcement
and entry. Almost every arrest situation has become, therefore, a case
of first impression. Nothing the Court said in Wong Sun can prop-
erly be construed as dispelling this unfortunate ambiguity. Likewise
Ker has only served to compound the problem. Putting aside Ker's
internal inconsistencies, it seems clear that if state law still governs the
question of arrest announcement (and this itself is not clear), it is
subject to the limitations of the fourth amendment. But observe what
result this incidentally produces. Federal attorneys must now argue
what state law is, and then justify it under a federal standard, all with-
out the participation of responsible state officials or definite guidelines.
What does this do to the concept of a healthy federalism? Under these
circumstances, the safest course of action for the conscientious federal
officer to follow is to impose on himself the strictest possible standard,
thus eliminating the possibility of pursuing a flexible course of conduct
tailored to meet each new situation. Even then he can expect the
result will often be that he will not be informed until after the entry
that the particular course of conduct chosen was "illegal." The situa-
tion in which search rather than arrest is concerned has fared a little
better, but only because there is an existing federal statute, which, of
course, has itself been inconsistently interpreted. The fundamental
point, however, remains valid. Under the present status of the law,
the interest each of us has in lawful and effective law enforcement is
today denied the simple due process requirement of an ascertainable
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standard of conduct. The point Mr. Justice Brandeis made in another
context should be made here: it is sometimes as "important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right." 81
In the final analysis, the aspect of Miller and Ker subject to the
strongest criticism is the disregard of what Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in his dissent in Rabinowitz termed "historical material." 882 At
common law, the rule of announcement was designed to avoid un-
necessary violence in the execution of civil process. The castle maxim,
historically understood, never properly applied to the execution of
criminal process, and the application of the rule of announcement was
until very recently untested dicta. The rule the Court in Miller and
Ker speaks about, however, is ambiguously offered as a protection not
against unnecessary violence but of some undefined aspect of the "right
of privacy." The distinction between privacy and violence is not just
a question of theory. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter also observed in
Rabinowitz, "where one comes out on a case depends on where one
goes in." "
A conclusion is, of course, not an appropriate time to attempt to
define the "right of privacy." For what Acton said of liberty, can be
said of privacy: It is "an idea of which there are two hundred defini-
tions . ... ," 84 It is, moreover, an idea "better suited to literary
than legal analysis." '8' It will be sufficient here, however, if we use
Mr. Justice Brandeis' own definition. The right of privacy may be
said to be the right "to be let alone." 8'
We may analyze the rule of announcement, then, in terms of two
quite different concepts. From the point of view of a "right to be let
alone," announcement is seen to be a condition precedent to the
existence of the opposite "right to enter," which, when in existence,
takes priority over the former "right to be let alone." The right to
enter to arrest or search, then, does not mature until notice is given
or an adequate substitute is present and the occupant consents. Notice
the emphasis on the occupant's consent. When he explicitly or im-
plicitly refuses to permit entry, such entry becomes lawful not by
consent but by operation of law. On the other hand, from the point
of view of force, announcement is seen as an option given under ordi-
nary circumstances to an occupant to avoid the use of physical violence.
38 1 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (dissenting
opinion of Brandeis, J.).
382 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
383 Ibid.
3 84 AcToN, EssAYs ON FREEDOM AND PowER 36 (Meridian ed. 1960).
385 Beany, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, in 1962
SupREmE CouRT RERvzwm 214 (Kurland ed.).
386 Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890).
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When the occupant refuses to permit entry, he and not the law may be
said to be the cause of the destruction of the public peace. Entry in
either situation under the force analysis is by operation of law and
not by consent. Here the question of consent is irrelevant.
The pragmatic difference between these two theoretical approaches
is brought sharply to the fore by the entry-by-trick-absent-force
situation. If the interest to be protected is the occupant's initial3 .
right voluntarily to relinquish his right to be let alone, then the dis-
senters in Jones v. United States88 have the best of the argument, and
Leahy v. United States .. was wrongly decided. Leahy, of course,
upheld outright misrepresentation; Jones upheld trick by implica-
tion. It is difficult to see how the distinction between the two is
meaningful. The entries in both cases were ultimately by ruse. Mean-
ingful consent played no part. But if it was unnecessary force which
was at issue, then it is hard to argue with the thrust of Judge Orr's
opinion in Leahy, and such cases as Gouled v. United States"'0 are
quickly placed in perspective. They involve ultimately questions going
not to the manner of entry but the right to enter. When the right to
enter exists, the manner of entry may be viewed in a different light.
Ultimately, this is the burden of Judge Orr's opinion. So Justices
Traynor and Weintraub likewise make clear in Maddox and Smith.
Not having analyzed precisely what is involved, the Court in
Miller and Ker also cannot be said to have properly balanced the
competing interests intertwined in the announcement situation. For,
as the late Judge Learned Hand put it, when you are dealing with
such admonitions as "unreasonable searches" there appears to be "no
escape in each situation from balancing the conflicting interests at
stake with as detached a temper as we can achieve." 91 Balancing,
moreover, is only part of the problem. As Professor Fried per-
suasively argues, the formulation of the interests is just as important;
it must always be asked "who" is asserting "what." 392
387 It is difficult to see how the right to consent to entry after announcement can
be considered more than an initial right. For immediately upon a refusal, all agree
the question of consent becomes moot How meaningful this concept of consent is,
moreover, is also open to question. Mr. Justice Rutledge, in dissent in Davis v.
United States, 328 U.S. 582, 623 (1946), aptly observes:
But the search followed on consent given in the reasonable belief that it was
necessary to avoid the breaking and entry. I think it was therefore in no
better case legally than if in fact the breaking and forceable entry had
occurred.
388 304 F.2d 381, 385-87 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 851 (1963).
389 272 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. granted, 363 U.S. 810 (1960), dismissed
by stipulation, 364 U.S. 945 (1961).
390255 U.S. 298 (1921).
391 HA-D, THE SpmnR oF LiBERTY 179 (Dillard 3d ed. 1960).
:392 See Fried, Two Concepts of Interest: Some Reflections on the Supreme
Court's Balancing Test, 76 ILuAv. L. Rnv. 755, 765-70 (1963).
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The rule of announcement has had its impact to date primarily in
two sharply defined areas of law enforcement: narcotics and gambling.
Each is but an aspect of the larger problem of organized crime. 93 Any
formulation of competing interests must then take this factor into
account. The danger to our freedom presented by organized crime
differs appreciably from the traditional danger that all crime poses. 94
Little recognition, however, of this fact appears in the opinions of some
of those participating in the law enforcement policy formulation of
our judiciary. 95 The majority in Miller, for example, saw fit to
write into the law an apparently rigid rule of announcement. The
absence of one word in announcement will call down upon all of the
officer's work the Draconic sanction of suppression. Evidently no
question of degree is involved. Such formalism is required, in spite
of the obvious fact that any announcement fairly imparting that
officers of the law seek admission inevitably carries with it some notice
of the official character of the visit. Does it really make a difference
whether the purpose is search or arrest? The probable cause which
serves to underwrite the arrest or search will, moreover, usually carry
with it the sound inference that the suspect or the occupant will be
fully aware of the purpose of the entry.
The majority in Miller were, of course, not totally oblivious to
the interests of sound law enforcement. They did recognize that in
certain situations facts known to an officer might warrant non-
compliance with what they articulated as the general rule. Yet the
test that was formulated to govern the situation was "virtual certainty."
One principle in the administration of law, however, is clear: there is
no certitude. We impose the death penalty based only on the lack of
"reasonable doubt." Search or arrest itself may be warranted by no
393 See generally Johnson, Organized Crime: Challenge to the American Legal
System, 53 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 399 (1962), 54 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 1, 127 (1963) ;
Hearings on Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Before the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-2 (1963) (the so-called Valachi hearings). See also
Symposium-The Nature of Organized Crime and Problems in Law Enforcement,
38 NOTRE DAME LA w. 627 (1963); Maas, Mafiia: The Inside Story, The Saturday
Evening Post, Aug. 10, 1963, p. 19.
394 See Tyler, An Interdisciplinary Attack on Organized Crime, 347 Annals, pp.
104, 109 (May 1963):
The present menace is real and frightening. In a society dedicated to the
rights of the individuals, organized crime deprives many individuals of their
inalienable rights, not by turning the overwhelming power of the state against
a citizen, but by exercising the power of private government against the
nonconformist. Strikers lose their right to picket; businessmen lose their
right to buy, manufacture, and sell as they please and are forced to accept
unwanted junior or senior partners; citizens lose the right to testify and
others are forced to bear false witness. Even the right to honest and free
elections is repeatedly jeopardized.
395 See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 469 n.19 (1962) (dissenting
opinion).
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more than the existence of "probable cause." It would appear, in fact,
that the test for entry is higher than the test for search or arrest itself.
If the majority is to be taken at its word there is no room for what
Mr. Justice Rutledge termed in Brinegar v. United States, "the
mistakes . . . of reasonable men." 391 A test of "virtual certainty,"
it is submitted, is both "unrealistic and visionary." 93
What appears to be asserted here, to adopt Professor Fried's
question, is the right in the usual gambling or narcotics case of the
occupant of a house to have an opportunity to destroy evidence398
prior to seizure or obtain its suppression after seizure. Further, the
right is asserted by a probable member of an organized conspiracy
against the rights of us all. It is difficult to see how such a right can
be recognized when so boldly stated. It is submitted, moreover, that
when the assertion is stripped of rhetoric, this is precisely what is
at issue.
It is true that the rigor of Miller must be contrasted with the
flexibility of Ker. Yet the promise of Ker seems limited to state law
enforcement. The careful articulation of supervisory-constitutional
suppression distinction does not leave the federal officer with the
feeling that his efforts will be looked on through the same eyes. The
"possibility that the evidence may be destroyed" exception will give
state officers room to tailor their actions to the concrete situation. It
appears doubtful, however, that federal officers will be accorded equal
treatment.
On the other hand, whatever may be said for the need to suppress
organized gambling and the narcotics traffic, there is still much to be
said for a rule which would require a certain amount of civility on the
part of the police officer before he enters the home of the ordinary
citizen. 99 Modern history has too often seen the police state's use
and abuse of the knock on the door. Even if we go back to the
enlightened community of Sodom, we find that the crowd before the
house of Lot did not just break in.4"' Yet, properly analyzed, it is
submitted, the real issue in the announcement situation is solely the
traditional question of force. Bringing in the amorphous concept of
privacy merely confuses the problem. And, as long as the Court con-
396338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
397 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
398 For example, it may take no less than thirty seconds to destroy all of the
evidence of a wire-service headquarters. See McClellan, Gambling and Organized
Crime, S. REP. No. 1310, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1962).
399 See generally SimoN, PHLOSOPHY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 112-18 (1951).
400 See Genesis 19:4-5. The experience of the King of Jericho with the spies in
Rahab's house is also illuminating. The walls would probably still have come tumbling
down, yet had he ordered an unannounced entry, the spies at least would not have
escaped. See Joshua 2:1-24.
558 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112:499
tinues to hold that state law governs the question, the inevitable tension
between the privacy analysis and the force rationale outlined above
will obtain.
So analyzed, the general rule properly becomes not that announce-
ment should be made but that entry should be peaceful. Forcible entry
becomes then the exception, and following the traditional analysis, the
burden lies on him who would bring it into play to establish the
necessity for it.' The police officer ought, therefore, in the usual
case to avoid force in obtaining entry by demanding it. Such a rule,
however, would not be inflexible. When the police officer could show
an acceptable reason for following another course of action the absence
of announcement would be irrelevant. Such an acceptable reason, for
example, would be the existence of a situation in which announcement
would fairly defeat the overriding right of entry to arrest or search.
Here the possibility of escape or the destruction of evidence comes to
the fore. Likewise when the officer reasonably fears a demand would
increase the likelihood of violence, it would be absurd to require it
under a rationale founded on a desire to avoid such violence. It is
not necessary to carry this tentative analysis out to greater length.
Given an articulation of the real issues involved, the way most ques-
tions would be decided under such a rule is not difficult to predict.
But what of the present state of the law? Has the Court finally
committed itself to a "privacy" analysis of announcement? 402 Can we
reasonably expect the Court to answer before long this and other
questions posed by this analysis of the rule of announcement? The
answer is fairly obvious. Of course we can. The real question is
whether we want to permit the chaos in law enforcement to continue
until the Court has had an opportunity to deal with it on a case by
case basis. Congress too has a responsibility to deal with this con-
fused situation. Appendix B contains a tentative draft of a statute
which would deal with many of these problems. It is here offered not
with the idea that it embodies the final word but the text of a solution
which could serve as a starting point for a meaningful dialogue.
A final word is necessary. The burden of much that has been
said here is adverse to the work of the Court in the area of criminal
procedure.4 0 3  Lest anyone misunderstand, let it be made clear that
401 See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
402 Mr. Justice Clark's opinion in Ker speaks much more about "reasonableness"
than "privacy." See 374 U.S. at 23.
403 Theheart of the criticism here is that of Professor Freund:
What gives concern . . . is . . . a tendency to make broad principles do
service for specific problems that call for differentiation, a tendency toward
overbroadness that is not an augury of enduring work and that misses the
opportunity to use the litigation process for the refinement and adaptation
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this criticism grows out of a profound respect for the Court as an
institution and the work of its individual members in this difficult area.
The Justices receive by and large altogether too little help from the
Bar that appears before them. They have likewise altogether too
many hard problems to attempt to solve in too short a period of time
by themselves. The work of forging the safeguards of liberty is too
precious to entrust to just nine men. Too often the "dialogue" on
these issues has existed solely between so-called "civil liberties" groups
and representatives of "crime commissions." The need here is for
objectivity." 4 Congress, the Bar, and the schools must begin to turn
their attention to these questions. 405  It is in this spirit that this dis-
cussion of Miller and Ker is offered and it is hoped that it will be
received in this spirit.
of principle to meet the variety of concrete issues as they are presented in a
lawsuit. . . The law of the future is likely to be the law that earns its
perdurance by solidity and strength of workmanship no less than by the appeal
its results make to our ethical sense.
FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 188 (Meridian ed. 1961).
404 On this point, Mr. Justice Cardozo should be remembered. In THE NATURE
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1921), he aptly observes: "We may try to see things
as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them with any eyes
except our own."
4D5To date there has been altogether too little serious attention devoted to these
issues, particularly where problems posed by organized crime are concerned. Lumbard,
Local and State Action Against Organized Crime, 347 Annals, pp. 82, 84 (May
1963), points this up: "Our foundations, universities, and other seats of intellectual
stirring, including serious current literature and journalism, are almost barren of
expressed concern for organized crime."
In some respects, it may be, perhaps, true that the facts of organized crime have
"outflanked" our thinking about crime and criminal procedure in terms of the tradi-
tional common-law crimes and the procedures adopted for their prosecution and the
protection of individual rights. The phrase, if not the idea, is Mr. Justice Brennan's
in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 471 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
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* 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1958) (search); ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 108 (1959) (search);
ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 153 (1959) (arrest w/warrant) ; ALA. CODa tit. 15, § 155 (1959)
(arrest w/o warrant); ALAsIA ComP. LAws ANN. § 12.25.100 (1962) (arrest) ;
ALAsKA ComP. LAWS ANN. § 12.35.040 (1962) (search); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1411 (1956) (arrest); ARiz. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 13-1446 (1956) (search); ARE.
STAT. ANN. § 43-414 (1947) (arrest); CAL. PEN. CODE § 844 (arrest); CAL. PEN.
CODE § 1531 (search); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2 5-1 2 9 (g) (1961) (search liquor); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-414(g) (1961) (search narcotics); FLA. STAT. A NN. § 901.19(1)(1944) (arrest) ; FI.A STAT. ANN. § 933.09 (1944) (search) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 27-205
(1953) (arrest w/warrant); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-301 (1953) (search); HAwAI
Rav. LAws § 255-11 (1955) (arrest) ; HAWAII REV. LAws § 255-22 (1955) (search) ;
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-611 (1947) (arrest); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4409 (1947)
(search); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 695 (Smith-Hurd 1934) (search); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 9-1009 (1956) (arrest); IoVA CODE ANN. § 751.9 (1950) (search); IowA
CODE Aq!ir. § 755.9 (1950) (arrest); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 41-1007 (1949) (search
liquor); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1819 (1949) (arrest); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 70.077 (1962) (search questionable); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 70.078 (1962)(arrest v/warrant); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 70.180 (1962) (arrest v/o warrant
questionable); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:46 (1950) (search); LA. REV. STAT. Amw.
§ 15:72 (1950) (arrest); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.880 (1954) (arrest) ; MiNN. STAT.
ANN. § 629.33 (1947) (arrest w/warrant); Mn N. STAT. ANN. § 629.34 (1947)
(arrest w/o warrant) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 2471 (1956) (arrest) ; Miss. CODE ANN.§ 2614 (1956) (search; liquor); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 544.200 (1953); MONT. REv.
CODES ANN. § 94-301-9 (1947) (search) ; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-6011 (1947)
(arrest); Nun. REV. STAT. § 29-411 (19"6) (arrest w/warrant; search); Nay. REv.
STAT. § 171.275 (1961) (arrest); NEv. REv. STAT. § 179.090 (1961) (search); N.Y.
CODE CaRI. PRoC. § 175 (arrest v/warrant) ; N.Y. CODE Cari. PRoc. § 178 (arrest
v/o warrant); N.Y. CODE CRwd. PROC. § 799 (search); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-44(1953) (arrest); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-14 (1960) (arrest); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 29-29-08 (1960) (search); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.12 (Page Supp. 1962)
(arrest; search); OiuA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 194 (1937) (arrest w/warrant);
Oxi.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 197 (1937) (arrest w/o warrant); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 1228 (1958) (search) ; ORE. REv. STAT. § 133.290 (1961) (arrest w/warrant) ;
ORE. REv. STAT. § 133.320 (1961) (arrest v/o warrant); Om REv. STAT. § 141.110(1961) (search); S.C. CODE § 53-198 (1962) (arrest); S.D. CODE § 34.1107 (1939)
(search); S.D. CODE § 34.1606 (1939) (arrest); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-509 (1955)
(search) ; TENN. CODE ANw. § 40-807 (1955) (arrest) ; TEX. CODE CnMr. PRoc. ANN.
art. 242 (1954) (arrest); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoC. AqN. art. 321 (1954) (search);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-12 (1953) (arrest); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-54-9 (1953)(searchy; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.31.040 (1961) (arrest); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 7-165 (1957) (arrest w/warrant; search).
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APPENDIX B
AN AcT
To amend chapter 205 of title 18, United States Code, with respect to announce-
ment in the forcible execution of search warrants and making arrests; and other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That (a) section 3109 of title 18 of the United
States Code is amended to read as follows:
"§ 3109 Breaking doors or windows for entry or exit to execute a search war-
rant or to make an arrest
"(a) Any officer authorized by law to make arrests, or to execute search war-
rants, or any person aiding such officer, may forcibly break and enter any outer or
inner door, or window of a dwelling house, or other building, or any part thereof,
or anything therein, or otherwise enter to execute a search or arrest warrant, or
to make an arrest where authorized by law without a warrant, or where necessary
to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of such warrant, or in
making such arrest.
"(b) Forcible breaking and entry shall not be made until after such person
makes an announcement of identity and purpose, and admittance to the dwelling
house is expressly or impliedly denied or unreasonably delayed.
"(c) An announcement shall not be required prior to such forcible breaking and
entry where such person reasonably believes:
(1) his identity or purpose is already known to any person in the premises; or
(2) such notice would result in the destruction or concealment of evidence sub-
ject to seizure; or
(3) such notice would increase the possibility of bodily peril to such person or a
third party; or
(4) such notice would permit the party to be arrested to escape; or
(5) such notice would otherwise be a useless gesture.
"(d) Evidence directly obtained because of a violation of this section, upon
proper motion of a person aggrieved, shall not be admissible in evidence at any
criminal hearing or trial. Evidence obtained after forcible or other entry by state
officers made in conformity with state procedure without federal participation shall
be admissible in any federal hearing or trial.
"(e) Whoever, after notice is given under subsection (b), or where the identity
of the officer is already known, destroys, conceals, disposes of, or attempts to destroy,
conceal or dispose of, or otherwise prevents, or attempts to prevent the seizure of,
evidence subject to seizure shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
"(f) As used in this Section:
(1) 'evidence subject to seizure' means any property for which a search war-
rant could be issued under Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, or which would be otherwise lawfully subject to seizure.
(2) 'forcibly break and enter' includes any use of physical force or violence
but does not include entry obtained by trick or strategem unaccompanied by
such force or violence.
(3) 'person aggrieved' means any person aggrieved within the meaning of
Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
"(g) If any provision of this section, or the application of such provision to
any person or circumstances, shall be held invalid, the remainder of this section or
the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than those as to
which it is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby."
and (b) by deleting the present analysis to section 3109 in chapter 205 and adding
the following item:
"Section 3109. Breaking doors or windows for entry or exit to execute a search
warrant or to make an arrest."
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